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Abstract
This paper compares two state-of-the-art but very distinct methods used in macroeconomics: 
rational-expectations DSGE and bounded rationality behavioural models. Both models are 
extended to include financial frictions on the supply side. The result in both frameworks 
is that production, supply of credit and the front payment to capital producers depend 
heavily on stock market cycles. During phases of optimism, credit is abundant, access to 
production capital is easy, the cash-in-advance constraint is lax, risks are undervalued, 
and production booms. But with a reversal in market sentiment, the contraction in all 
these parameters is deep and sometimes asymmetric. This is all the more evident in the 
behavioural model, where economic agents’ cognitive limitations exacerbate the contraction. 
While both models capture the empirical regularities very well, the validation exercise is even 
more favourable to the behavioural model.
Keywords: supply side, beliefs, financial frictions, model validations.
JEL classification: B41, C63, C68, E22, E23, E37.
Resumen
En este trabajo se comparan dos metodologías macroeconómicas punteras pero a la vez 
muy distintas: el modelo DSGE con expectativas racionales y el modelo de comportamiento 
con racionalidad limitada. Procedemos a ampliar los dos para incluir fricciones financieras 
por el lado de la oferta agregada. En ambos casos, los resultados apuntan a que la 
producción, la oferta de crédito y el pago anticipado a los productores de capital dependen 
en gran medida de los ciclos bursátiles. Durante las fases de optimismo, el crédito es 
abundante, hay facilidad de acceso al capital, existen pocas restricciones al pago por 
adelanto, los riesgos se infravaloran y se produce un boom en la producción. Sin embargo, 
cuando el clima de los mercados cambia, la contracción de todas estas variables se vuelve 
más profunda y asimétrica. Esto es aún más evidente en el modelo de comportamiento, 
en el que las limitaciones cognitivas de los agentes económicos generan una contracción 
aún mayor. Aunque ambos modelos captan correctamente las regularidades empíricas, los 
ejercicios de validación son incluso más favorables para el modelo de comportamiento. 
Palabras clave: oferta agregada, creencias, fricciones financieras, validación de modelos.
Códigos JEL: B41, C63, C68, E22, E23, E37.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1626
1 Motivation
It has long been recognized that the (aggregate) supply-side and financial markets
can be powerful generators and propagators of shocks. An increase (a drop) in the
price of capital, commodities or cost of labour can cause a significant contraction
(expansion) in output via the production or investment channel. Equally, a rise in
the cost of credit or a shortage of (financial market) liquidity will in many cases cause
a fall in output via a multitude of channels (consumption, investment, production,
trade) depending on the segment of the market that is hit by the shock. Yet less
efforts have so far been invested in understanding the interaction between financial
markets and the aggregate supply side. In particular, it is less well understood in
what ways and under what conditions the supply side can work as a propagator
of shocks generated in the financial sector, or more generally of financial shocks.
Nonetheless, a number of recent empirical studies suggest that this interaction is at
the core of the contraction in GDP during the Great Recession. Despite the fact
that the original negative shocks were generated in the financial sector, a sharp drop
in aggregate supply is observed.
One of those studies is Broadbent (2012, 2013), who finds that the main reason
for the most recent contraction in the UK economy has been a fall in underlying
productivity growth.1The observed contraction in output coupled with a relatively
high level of employment and inflation in the Great Recession period up to 2013
is better explained by an independent hit to supply rather than a weak demand.
He argues that a combination of uneven demand across sectors combined with an
impaired financial system that is not capable of reallocating capital resources suf-
ficiently quickly to respond to shocks has lead to a reduction in aggregate output
per employee. Such a process would equally result in a rise in volatility in relative
prices and the widening sectoral dispersion of profitability that is observed in the
UK data. Moreover, while investment has risen in some sectors, on aggregate it
has fallen meaning that the fall in some sectors has more-than-outpassed the rise
in others. Likewise, Barnett et al (2014a) employ a highly stylized model of the
economy to show that the increased price dispersion is a consequence of frictions to
efficient capital allocation. Along similar lines, Barnett et al (2014b) believe that
inefficient allocation of credit is the most plausible factor behind low productivity
growth in the UK since the crisis.
1The predicted productivity growth is equally expected to be below-par.
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Chadha and Warren (2012) estimate a business cycle accounting (BCA) model to
find that the main cause of the output variation during the Great Recession to be the
variation in the efficiency wedge of production, rather than any of the other factors,
such as the labour supply, investment or total expenditure wedge. Moreover, they
run a BCA decomposition on a version of the BGG model that includes a dominant
asset price shock and find that the shock does neither appear as a consumption
nor investment wedge in the BCA analysis. Taken together, this implies that the
asset price shock may show up in other wedges in the BCA framework, and that
the shocks transmitted via the supply-side may be generated elsewhere. Hence, the
role of asset prices for the wider economy must be considered more broadly, as their
impacts in general equilibrium may be to shift labour supply, or even to shift the
ratio of outputs to inputs.
At the same time, Manasse (2013) argues that the cause for the most recent
recession in Italy is a weak and anemic supply side. A lack of reform in the product,
labor and credit markets has resulted in weak (if not zero) innovation, competitive-
ness and productivity performance for more than a decade.2
On the contrary, many financial friction models have concentrated on the demand-
side effects from financial cycles.3Many have investigated the impact of asset prices
and/or risks on the demand for credit, investment, demand for mortgages, consump-
tion, labour supply, demand for capital, etc. In (most of) these models, financial
prices alter the value of collateral, perception of risks, probability of default, or
future propensity to save, which alters the aggregate demand allocations.
However, in the current paper we wish to investigate the impact of financial
swings on the supply side of the economy.4
In particular, we are interested in examining how imperfect credit and stock mar-
kets affect the allocations on the production side of the economy, and specifically the
effects it has on the supply of capital and credit, demand for labour and technology.
In addition, we wish to understand whether this mechanism is more accurately cap-
2This empirical tendency applies to several other Eurozone countries, such as Spain, Portugal,
Greece, and to some extent France.
3See, amongst others, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Christiano et al (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), Gertler et al (2012).
4A related literature to this one is Justiniano et al (2010, 2011) who investigate the business
cycle role of shocks to marginal efficiency of investments, or Altig et al (2011) who explore the
importance of firm-specific capital for driving the business cycle. Lastly Smets and Wouters (2005,
2007) Gerali et al (2010) and Christiano et al (2010, 2013) also include a more elaborate supply
side in their models, but do not specifically focus on the role of the supply-side as a propagator of
financial shocks by altering the input-output ratio, labour productivity, or aggregate output per
employee.
3
C dha and Warren (2012) es imate a busi ess cycle accoun ing (BCA) model to
find that the main cause of the output variation during e Great Rec ssion to be the
variation in the efficiency wedge of produc ion, rather than any of the ther fac ors,
s ch as the lab ur supply, i vestment r otal expenditure wedge. Moreover, they
run a BCA decompositio on version f the BGG model that includes a do inant
asset price shock and find that the shock does nei her appear as a consumption
nor investment wedge in the BCA analysis. Take together, this implies that the
asset price shock may show up in other wedges in th BCA framework, a d that
the shocks ransmitted via th supply-side may be generat elsewhere. Hence, the
role of asset prices for the wider economy must be c nsidered m e broadly, as heir
impacts in general equilibrium may be to shift labour supply, or even to shift the
ratio of outputs to inputs.
At the same time, Manasse (2013) argues that the cause f r the most recent
recession in Italy is a weak nd anemic supply s de. A lack of reform in the roduct,
labor and credit markets has resulted in weak (if not zero) innovation, competitive-
ness and pr ductivity performance for more than a decade.2
On the contrary, many financial friction models have conc ntrated on the demand-
side effects from financi l cycles.3Many have investigated the i pact of asset prices
and/or risks on the demand for credit, investment, demand for mortgag s, co sump-
tion, labour supply, demand for capital, etc. In (most of) these models, financial
prices alter the value of collater l, perception of risks, prob bility f default, or
future propensity to save, which alters the aggregate demand allocations.
However, in the current pap r we wish to investigate the impact of financial
swings on the supply side of th economy.4
In particular, we are interested in examining how imperfect credit and stock mar-
kets affect the allocations on the production side of the economy, and specifically the
effects it has on the supply of c pital and c edit, demand for labour nd technology.
In addition, we wish to understand whether this mechanism is more accurately cap-
2This empirical tendency applies to several other Eurozone countries, such as Spain, Portugal,
Greece, and to some extent France.
3See, amongst others, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Christiano et al (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), Gertler et al (2012).
4A related literature to this one is Justiniano et al (2010, 2011) who investigate the business
cycle role of shocks to marginal efficiency of investments, or Altig et al (2011) who explore the
importance of firm-specific capital for driving the business cycle. Lastly Smets and Wouters (2005,
2007) Gerali et al (2010) and Christiano et al (2010, 2013) also include a more elaborate supply
side in their models, but do not specifically focus on the role of the supply-side as a propagator of
financial shocks by altering the input-output ratio, labour productivity, or aggregate output per
employee.
3
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1626
tured in a rational expectations framework, or whether a relaxing of this assumption
is necessary. The alternative model we use to evaluate the importance of rational
expectations hypothesis in terms of empirical validity of the mechanism is a be-
havioural model. In this framework, all the dynamics and transmission mechanisms
are identical to the DSGE model, except for the premise on agent behaviour. Here,
instead, agents have cognitive limitations and base their inferences on standardized
heuristics. We perform model validations using impulse response analyses, statisti-
cal comparisons, moment matching and business cycle comparisons using more than
60 years of filtered macroeconomic and financial data.
We find that allowing financial shocks to be propagated via the supply side in
an otherwise standard financial accelerator model intensifies the transmission of
shocks by between 15 and 25 %. Compared to a model where only the stock market
mechanism is incorporated, the impulse responses to a financial shock, for instance,
are on average 25% lower. Variance decomposition further affirms the importance of
aggregate supply-financial market interaction since approximately 75% of the model
variation can be explained by the financial and TFP shocks jointly. In addition, the
model is capable of replicating many of the statistical moments of the US data, in
particular for labor, investment, marginal costs, capital and inflation. On a deeper
level, we contrast the quantitative results from a fully rational DSGE model to a
bounded rationality behavioural one. The comparative analysis confirms that both
models perform well in matching the data moments, as well as generating powerful
propagation of shocks. The empirical fit is much better compared to competing
models where those mechanisms are excluded. Nontheless, to additionally relax the
rational expectations hypothesis improves even further the empirical fit to data, and
the asymmetric nature of many macroeconomic and financial variables. The trade-
off, however, is that the supply side becomes (in relative terms to the DSGE model)
a weaker propagator of financial (and monetary) shocks. To conclude, while the
model construction in the behavioural version is very intuitive and agents’ behaviour
micro-founded, the tractability of the model solution is to some extent compromised
in comparison to the rational DSGE counterpart.
2 Model set-up
To incorporate a supply side with an asset price bubble and financing constraints in
a general equilibrium framework, we apply the following (and equal) modifications
4
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in both models. The first modification is an extension of the financial accelerator
mechanism onto input market. We allow a firm’s purchasing position on the input
markets to directly depend on their financial state. A higher value of net worth
means that the collateral constraint the producing firm faces is lower. As a result it
can borrow more, which will press the marginal costs down, and therefore they will
be able to buy capital inputs at a lower price.
The second modification is a pay-in-advance constraint on the input market. We
impose the condition that (a share of) the cost of capital must be paid in advance
of purchase in order to insure capital good producers that they will sell what they
produce. It is a kind of depository insurance. Firms will finance it with a share
of the (liquid) external financing that they get. Since this in turn depends on the
cash position that they will hold in the next period, the expected (stock) market
price will de facto reflect the price they have to pay in advance for the capital. A
higher expected value of the (stock) market price improves the borrowing conditions
of the firm today, meaning that she can already in the current period commit to pay
more for the inputs. This will increase the quantity of outputs produced in the next
period. Once they reach the next period, the (stock) market price will be realised,
pushing their net worth up and therefore they will be able to repay their debt in
full. We make the down payment time varying over the business cycle in order to
capture the asymmetries in financial (or liquidity) positions over the cycle.
The third modification we introduce is a rate of utilization of capital. Producing
firms, apart from choosing the amount of capital to purchase and use in the pro-
duction, also choose the rate at which capital will be used in the production. The
higher the rate, the more effective use is made of capital in the production func-
tion and the more (intermediate) products can be produced for the same amount
of capital. However, increasing the capital utilization cost is also costly because it
causes a faster rate of capital depreciation. Hence in this modified version of the
model, entrepreneurs do not only choose the quantity of capital to be purchased
from the capital good producers, but also the rate at which they will use this capital
in production.
Keeping these modifications constant in both models, the difference between
the two frameworks will however lie in agents’ information set and expectations
formation. While agents use perfect information (or equally distributed imperfect
information, i.e. an ignorance factor which is equal in size throughout the entire
population) to form rational expectations in the DSGE model, in the behavioural
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framework agents have limited cognitive abilities which forces them to form expec-
tations using an incomplete information set (i.e. bounded rationality). As a result,
they need to make intertemporal decisions using (imperfect) forecasts. Forecasts,
in turn, are chosen using a historical performance record of alternative forecast er-
rors. The model producing the smallest forecast error is chosen. There is therefore
a strong history dependance in the forecasts, resulting in strong market-sentiment
swings. We will outline the mechanism in further detail under section 3.
We proceed by incorporating these mechanisms in a DSGE model, followed by
the behavioural. For the sake of tractability, in the second part we will only focus
on the supply-side extensions that differ from the DSGE version.
2.1 DSGE model construction
In what follows, we will disentangle capital production from capital utilization rate,
and introduce variable capital usage in an otherwise standard financial accelerator
model (augmented with stock market cycles) as in Gerba (2014).5The production
side of the economy consists of three types of nonfinancial firms: capital good pro-
ducers, entrepreneurs, and retailers. Let us describe their optimization problems.
2.1.1 Capital Good Producers
Following Gerali et al (2010), perfectly competitive capital good producers (CGP)
produce a homogeneous good called ’capital services’ using input of the final output
from entrepreneurs (1 − δ)kt−1 and retailers (it) and the production is subject to
investment adjustment costs. They sell new capital to entrepreneurs at price Qt.
Given that households own the capital producers, the objective of a CGP is to choose
Kt and It to solve:
max
Kt,It
E0Σ
∞
t=0Λ0,t[Qt[Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]− It] (1)
subject to:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + [1− κ
2
[
It
It−1
− 1]2]It (2)
where [1− κ
2
( it
it−1
− 1)2]It is the adjustment cost function. κ denotes the cost for
adjusting investment. Including adjustment costs of investment in the production
5For the remaining model set-up, we refer to aforementioned paper.
6
framework agents have limited cognitive abilities which forces them to form expec-
tations using an incomplete information set (i.e. bounded rationality). As a result,
they need to make intertemporal decisions using (imperfect) forecasts. Forecasts,
in turn, are chosen using a historical performance record of alternative forecast er-
rors. The model producing the smallest forecast error is chosen. There is therefore
a strong history dependance in the forecasts, resulting in strong market-sentiment
swings. We will outline the mechanism in further detail under section 3.
We proceed by incorporating these mechanisms in a DSGE model, followed by
the behavioural. For the sake of tractability, in the second part we will only focus
on the supply-side extensions that differ from the DSGE version.
2.1 DSGE model construction
In what follows, we will disentangle capital production from capital utilization rate,
and introduce variable capital usage in an otherwise standard financial accelerator
model (augmented with stock market cycles) as in Gerba (2014).5The production
side of the economy consists of three types of nonfinancial firms: capital good pro-
ducers, entrepreneurs, and retailers. Let us describe their optimization problems.
2.1.1 Capital Good Producers
Following Gerali et al (2010), perfectly competitive capital good producers (CGP)
produce a homogeneous good called ’capital services’ using input of the final output
from entrepreneurs (1 − δ)kt−1 and retailers (it) and the production is subject to
investment adjustment costs. They sell new capital to entrepreneurs at price Qt.
Given that households own the capital producers, the objective of a CGP is to choose
Kt and It to solve:
max
Kt,It
E0Σ
∞
t=0Λ0,t[Qt[Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]− It] (1)
subject to:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + [1− κ
2
[
It
It−1
− 1]2]It (2)
where [1− κ
2
( it
it−1
− 1)2]It is the adjustment cost function. κ denotes the cost for
adjusting investment. Including adjustment costs of investment in the production
5For the remaining model set-up, we refer to aforementioned paper.
6
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1626
of capital solves the so-called ’investment puzzle’ and produces the hump-shaped
investment in response to a monetary policy shock (Christiano et al, 2011).
2.1.2 Entrepreneurs
Perfectly competitive entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using the constant
returns to scle technology:
Yt = At[ψ(ut)Kt]
αL1−α (3)
with At being stochastic total factor productivity, ut the capacity utilization rate,
and Kt and Lt capital and labor inputs. Capital is homogeneous in this model.
6 We
assume a fixed survivial rate of entrepreneurs in each period γ, in order to ensure
a constant amount of exit and entry of firms in the model. This assumption also
assures that firms will always depend on external finances for their capital purchases,
and so will never become financially self-sufficient.
Just as in the canonical financial accelerator model (Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1999) as well as in the extension (Gerba, 2014), we will continue to work
under the framework that all earnings (after paying the input costs) from production
are re-invested into the company such that a constant share is paid out to share-
holders.7This is why entrepreneurs will maximize their value function rather than
their production function.8
Entrepreneurs also choose the level of capacity utilization, ψ(ut) (Kydland and
Prescott (1988), Bills and Cho (1994)). As is standard in the capital utilization liter-
ature, the model assumes that using capital more intensively raises the rate at which
it depreciates.9The increasing, convex function ψ(ut)kt denotes the (relative) cost in
units of investment good of setting the utilization rate to ut. This is chosen before
the realization of the production shock (see Auernheimer and Trupkin (2014) for
similar assumption). This timing assumption is important because it separates the
choice of the stock of productive factor Kt, taken before the revelation of the states
of nature, from the choice of the flow of factor utKt, taken during the production
6We could have made capital firm-specific, but the set-up would have to be much more complex
without altering qualitatively the results. Using homogeneous capital assumption is standard in
these type of models, see for instance Bernanke et al (1999), Gerali et al (2010), Gertler et al
(2012).
7In our excercises, we will set this share to 0, just as in Bernanke et al (1999).
8And so yt is not a direct argument of the function.
9We could equally assume a fixed rate of capital depreciation and impose a cost in terms of
output of using capital more intensively, as in Christiano et al (2005) or Gerali et al (2010).
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Kt,It
E0Σ
∞
t=0Λ0,t[Qt[Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]− It] (1)
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Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + [1− κ
2
[
It
It−1
− 1]2]It (2)
where [1− κ
2
( it
it−1
− 1)2]It is the adjustment cost function. κ denotes the cost for
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5For the remaining model set-up, we refer to aforementioned paper.
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process.
The choice of the rate of capital utilization involves the following trade-off. On
the one hand, a higher ut implies a higher output. On the other hand, there is
a cost from a higher depreciation of the capital stock. Therefore this rate can be
understood as an index that shows how much of the stock of capital is operated
relative to the steady state, per unit of time, given a capital-labor services ratio.
Moreover we specify the following functional form for ψ(ut):
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (4)
in line with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), Gerali et al (2010), and Auern-
heimer and Truphin (2014). As a result, an entrepreneur will now maximize its
value (profit) function according to:
V = maxE0
∞∑
k=0
[(1− µ)
∫ 
0
ωdFωU rkt+1]Et(R
ks
t+1)Stψ(ut)Kt+1 −Rt+1[StKt+1 −Nt+1]
(5)
with µ representing the proportion of the realized gross payoff to entrepreneurs’
capital going to monitoring, ω is an idiosyncratic disturbance to entrepreneurs’
return (and  is hence the threshold value of the shock), EtR
ks
t+1 is the expected
stochastic return to stocks, and U rkt+1 is the ratio of the realized returns to stocks to
the expected return (≡ Rkst+1/Et[Rkst+1]).
To understand how a firm’s financial position influences its’ purchasing power in
the capital input market, we need to understand the costs it faces. A firm minimizes
the following cost function:
S(Y ) = min
k,l
[Rst+1Kt + wtLt] (6)
The real marginal cost is therefore s(Y ) = ∂(S(Y )
∂(Y )
, which is:
s(Y ) =
1
1− α
1−α 1
α
α
(rst+1)
α(wt)
1−α (7)
The return on capital is defined as Rst+1 =
Et[St+1]−St
St
.10Keeping the wage rate
10Following on from Gerba (2014) and dissentangeling Tobin’s Q, we define the (stock) market
value of capital St as the total value of the firm, including intangibles, meanwhile the book value
Qt is the accounting value of the firm that includes tangibles only. The difference between the
two is the residual earnings REt, which varies positively with (expected) firm performance and
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constant, an increase in the expected (stock) market value of capital reduces the
(relative) cost of capital service inputs, purchased at today’s capital price.11This is
easier to see in the entrepreneur’s budget constraint:12
ϑEt[St+1]Kt+1 + wtLt + ψ(ut)kt−1 +RtBt−1 + (1− ϑ)StKt = Yt
Xt
+ Bt + St(1− δ)Kt−1 ⇒
ϑEt[St+1]Kt+1 + wtLt + ψ(ut)Kt +Rt[StKt −Nt] + (1− ϑ)StKt =
Yt
Xt
+ [Et[St+1]Kt+1 −Nt+1] + Et[St](1− δ)Kt−1 (8)
with δ being the depreciation rate of capital, ψ(ut)Kt−1 the cost of setting a level
ut of the utilization rate, ϑ is the front payment share to CGP, and
Pwt
Pt
= 1
Xt
is the
relative competitive price of the wholesale good in relation to the retail good.13An
increase in the expected market price (right-hand side) has two effects. First, it
reduces the relative cost of capital purchases today since firms can borrow more and
pay a higher pre-payment share ϑ of capital. Second, a higher market price means
that the probability of default of an entrepreneur reduces (since the value of the firm
is higher) and so CGP will expect entrepreneurs to be solvent in the next period
and will therefore require a smaller front payment (i.e. ϑ on the left-hand side will
fall). Let us explain the second mechanism in further detail.
As a form of depository insurance, CGP will (in some periods) require en-
trepreneurs to pay in period ’t’ a share of the total capital produced and delivered to
entrepreneurs in period ’t+1’. In particular, when CGP suspect that entrepreneurs
will face liquidity problems in the next period, a lower production, or a lower col-
lateral value in the next period, they expect the firm to be less solvent (in relative
terms). Because the defualt probability of entrepreneurs rises, CGP become suspi-
economic prospects. Market value of capital determines the level of firm (physical) investments. As
a result, periods of high price-to-book ratios and positive economic outlook will drive investment
up by significantly more than in standard DSGE models. In return, when corporate and economic
outlook worsen, investor confidence on the stock markets will fall, driving down the market value
of capital, and therefore also (physical) investment. For a more detailed background on capital
prices and a discussion of macroeconomic implications of this stock market mechanism, refer to
Gerba (2014).
11In line with the costs that intermediate firms face in the model of Christiano et al (2005).
12We assume that entrepreneurs borrow up to a maximum permitted by the borrowing con-
straint.
13Note that ϑEt[St+1]Kt+1 < Et[St+1]Kt+1.
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constant, an increase in the expected (stock) market value of capital reduces the
(relative) cost of capital service inputs, purchased at today’s capital price.11This is
easier to see in the entrepreneur’s budget constraint:12
ϑEt[St+1]Kt+1 + wtLt + ψ(ut)kt−1 +RtBt−1 + (1− ϑ)StKt = Yt
Xt
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ut of the utilization rate, ϑ is the front payment share to CGP, and
Pwt
Pt
= 1
Xt
is the
relative competitive price of the wholesale good in relation to the retail good.13An
increase in the expected market price (right-hand side) has two effects. First, it
reduces the relative cost of capital purchases today since firms can borrow more and
pay a higher pre-payment share ϑ of capital. Second, a higher market price means
that the probability of default of an entrepreneur reduces (since the value of the firm
is higher) and so CGP will expect entrepreneurs to be solvent in the next period
and will therefore require a smaller front payment (i.e. ϑ on the left-hand side will
fall). Let us explain the second mechanism in further detail.
As a form of depository insurance, CGP will (in some periods) require en-
trepreneurs to pay in period ’t’ a share of the total capital produced and delivered to
entrepreneurs in period ’t+1’. In particular, when CGP suspect that entrepreneurs
will face liquidity problems in the next period, a lower production, or a lower col-
lateral value in the next period, they expect the firm to be less solvent (in relative
terms). Because the defualt probability of entrepreneurs rises, CGP become suspi-
economic prospects. Market value of capital determines the level of firm (physical) investments. As
a result, periods of high price-to-book ratios and positive economic outlook will drive investment
up by significantly more than in standard DSGE models. In return, when corporate and economic
outlook worsen, investor confidence on the stock markets will fall, driving down the market value
of capital, and therefore also (physical) investment. For a more detailed background on capital
prices and a discussion of macroeconomic implications of this stock market mechanism, refer to
Gerba (2014).
11In line with the costs that intermediate firms face in the model of Christiano et al (2005).
12We assume that entrepreneurs borrow up to a maximum permitted by the borrowing con-
straint.
13Note that ϑEt[St+1]Kt+1 < Et[St+1]Kt+1.
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cious of the entrepreneur’s ability to pay for the entire capital purchased. Therefore,
as an insurance mechanism, CGP will ask the entrepreneur to pay in advance a share
f its capital productio .14
If the entrepreneur’s value is expected to increase in the next period, the financing
constraint it faces will loosen, and thus it can borrow more. Since it can borrow
more, it has more money to purchase the inputs (i.e. the marginal cost of a unit
of capital decreases, ceteris paribus) and therefore produce more outputs. This will
push the price of capital in the future up. The CGP anticipating this, will require
a smaller share of capital production to be pre-paid. On the other end, if the value
of the firm is expected to fall, on the other hand, then the cost of financing will
increase and the firm will be able to borrow less. Because it can borrow less , it
has less money to purchase inputs, and this will push the price of capital down in
the future. In anticipation of this, CGP will require a higher front payment. Hence,
we expect the share ϑ to vary over the business cycle. Formally, the pay-in-advance
constraint that entrepreneurs face in the input market is:
Et[St+1]Kt+1 ≤ ϑtBt ≡ ϑt
[
Et[St+1]Kt+1
Nt
]
(9)
So the down payment share of capital purchases will depend on the entrepreneur’s
financial position Bt. We can equivalently express it in terms of the additional
external funds that the entrepreneur needs for its capital purchases (right-hand side
in the above expression) using the fact that an entrepreneur will borrow up to a
maximum and use it to purchase capital:15 We allow ϑ to vary over time in order to
capture the variations in CGP’s pre-cautionary motive over the business cycle. A
value of 1 means that the entrepreneur will need to use all of his external finances
(loan) to pay for the capital purchases since CGP expects its financial (cash) position
to worsen in the next period. Equivalently, a value of 0 means that no pre-payment
is required as CGP expects the entrepreneur to be able to pay in full for its purchases
in the next period. As a result, the constraint will not be binding.
Both the individual and aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
14We could equivalently assume that legal conditions/constraints stipulate that entrepreneurs
need to pay in advance for their inputs as in Champ and Freedman (1990, 1994). Our approach is
analogue to the one taken in Fuerst (1995) or Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) for labor input
costs.
15See Bernanke et al (1999) and Gerba (2014) for a more profound discussion of the en-
trepreneur’s capital demand behaviour.
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external funds that the entrepreneur needs for its capital purchases (right-hand side
in the above expression) using the fact that an entrepreneur will borrow up to a
maximum and use it to purchase capital:15 We allow ϑ to vary over time in order to
capture the variations in CGP’s pre-cautionary motive over the business cycle. A
value of 1 means that the entrepreneur will need to use all of his external finances
(loan) to pay for the capital purchases since CGP expects its financial (cash) position
to worsen in the next period. Equivalently, a value of 0 means that no pre-payment
is required as CGP expects the entrepreneur to be able to pay in full for its purchases
in the next period. As a result, the constraint will not be binding.
Both the individual and aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
14We could equivalently assume that legal conditions/constraints stipulate that entrepreneurs
need to pay in advance for their inputs as in Champ and Freedman (1990, 1994). Our approach is
analogue to the one taken in Fuerst (1995) or Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) for labor input
costs.
15See Bernanke et al (1999) and Gerba (2014) for a more profound discussion of the en-
trepreneur’s capital demand behaviour.
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Kt = (1− δψ(ut))Kt−1 +Ψ( It
Kt
)Kt−1 (10)
where Ψ( It
Kt
)Kt−1 are the capital adjustment costs in the usage of capital. Ψ(.)
is increasing and convex, and Ψ(0) = 0. The term δψ(ut) follows Burnside and
Eichenbaum (1996) and represents the endogenous capital depreciation rate, which
is important for the propagation of productivity shocks (see Greenwood et al (2000),
or Albonico et al (2014)).16
The remaining equations for entrepreneurs are as in Gerba (2014).
2.1.3 Retailers
To incorporate nominal rigidities, a standard feature of New-Keynesian models, we
incorporate a retail sector into this model. Let us look at retailers’ problem. The
prices are sticky (Calvo, 1983) and indexed to a combination of past and steady-
state inflation, with relative weights parametrized by lP . If retailers want to change
their price beyond what indexation allows, they face a quadratic adjustment cost,
governed by κP . Retailers choose Pt(j) so as to maximize:
max
Pt(j)
ΩR = E0
∞∑
k=0
θkΛt,k[Pt(j)yt(j)− P ∗t yt(j)−
κp
2
[
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− pilpt−1pi1−lp ]2Ptyt] (11)
with θk being the probability that a retailer does not change his price in a
given period, Λt,k ≡ β CtCt+1 denoting the household intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution (since households are the shareholders of the retail firms), which they
take as given (Xt is the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods). They
face a demand curve equal to:
yt(j) = [
Pt(j)
Pt
]−
y
t yt (12)
where yt is the stochastic demand price elasticity.
17Lastly, profits from retail
activity are rebated lump-sum to households.
16The log-linearized version of this expression is: kt = (1 − δψ(ut))kt−1 + δit, as in Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) or Gerba (2014) and the one used in the simulations. δit is the steady
state version of Ψ( ItKt )Kt−1.
17It would be dynamically equivalent to have entrepreneurs operate in monopolistically com-
petitive markets without altering our results. However, the derivation of the the optimal financial
contracts and the aggregation would be more cumbersome since in that case the demand for capital
by individual firms is no longer in net worth. Therefore we opt for separating the two.
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2.2 DSGE model derivations
2.2.1 Optimizations
We begin by describing the optimization problems of the three agents in the DSGE
model economy. The household-, financial-, and the government sectors are equiv-
alent to the model in Gerba (2014). We therefore refer to the paper for a detailed
derivation of their optimization problems.
Capital Good Producers
The capital good producer maximizes its expected present value stream of profits
expressed in equation I.15. Since the owners of CGP are households, the pricing ker-
nel is βλt, with λt denoting the Lagrange multiplier in the representative household’s
optimization problem. The FOC for CGP is therefore:
Qkt − βEt[
λt+1
λt
(1− δ)Qkt+1] = λcgpt − βEt[
λt+1
λt
(1− δ)Qcgpt+1] (13)
The condition has to hold in each period, which allows us to split it into two
equations. The real price of capital is just the Lagrange multiplier (see Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). Hence, we get:
Qkt = λ
cgp
t ⇒ Et[Qkt+1] = Et[λcgpt+1] (14)
λcgpt [1−
κ
2
[
it
it−1
− 1]2 − κ[ it
it−1
− 1] it
it−1
] + βEt[
λt+1
λt
λcgpt κ[
it+1
it
− 1][it+1
it
]2] = 1 (15)
Substituting Qkt = λ
cgp
t into the second FOC, we get that the real price of capital
is determined by:
Qkt [1−
κ
2
[
it
it−1
− 1]2 − κ[ it
it−1
− 1] it
it−1
] + βEt[
λt+1
λt
Qkt κ[
it+1
it
− 1][it+1
it
]2] = 1 (16)
In the steady state, the price of capital will be equal to 1. Lastly we have the
constraint I.16 as our last FOC. In the steady state, investment will be equal to:
δkK.
Lastly, the capital production inclusive of investment adjustment costs is18:
18Note that around the aggregate steady state, the part of capital that will matter is the
one purchased and processed by entrepreneurs in the intermediate sector. This means that, on
12
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Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + [1− κ
2
[
it
it−1
− 1]2]It (17)
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs maximize their value in equation I.17 subject to the production
technology I.18, the pay-in-advance constraint I.23, and the borrowing constraint:19
Bt+1 ≤ ψ(st)Nt+1 (18)
ψ(st) is the cost of borrowing, or the external finance premium. Remember that
ψ′(.) > 0 and ψ(1) = 1. From Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and Gerba
(2014) we know that entrepreneurs will borrow up to a maximum so that this con-
straint will bind. By model construction it can easily be shown that in equilibrium,
Dt = Bt, so that household deposits in intermediaries equal total loanable funds
supplied to interpreneurs.
The utilization cost function in equation I.18 is described by 4, and the capital
accumulates according to 10. Lastly, the entrepreneur minimizes the cost function
specified in 6. Entrepreneurs FOC with respect to labor demand Lt, physical capital
Kt, and the degree of capacity utilization ut are therefore:
20
(1− α)yt
lt
= xtwt (19)
λtq
k
t = Et[St+1]Kt−Nt+1+λt+1Et[αat+1[ktut+1]α−1l1−αt+1 ]ut+1+(1− δ)qkt+1−ψ(ut+1)]
(20)
αat[kt−1ut]α−1l1−αt kt−1 − [ξ1 + ξ2(ut − 1)]kt−1 = 0⇒
ξ1 + ξ2(ut − 1) = αat[kt−1ut]α−1l1−αt ≡ rkt (21)
aggregate, the investment adjustment costs will be parametrized to a very small number and
therefore can be neglected in the full system. Only the depreciation and utilization rates of capital
will matter on aggregate.
19The derivation of this constraint is the same as in Bernanke et al (1999). We therefore refer
to the paper for more details.
20The derivation fo the FOC for borrowing is slightly more complicated as it includes idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate risk. That is the same as in Appendix A of Bernanke et al (1999) and we
therefore refer to the paper appendix for further details.
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aggregate, the investment adjustment costs will be parametrized to a very small number and
therefore can be neglected in the f ll system. Only the depreciation and utilization rates of capital
will matter on aggregate.
19The derivation of this constraint is the same as in Bernanke et al (1999). We therefore refer
to the paper for more details.
20The derivation fo the FOC for borrowing is slightly more complicated as it includes idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate risk. That is the same s in Appendix A of Bernanke et al (1999) and we
therefore refer to the paper appendix for further details.
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In our calibrations, we will normalize the ξ’s, which implies that rkt = ut.
λt = γt(1 + rt) + Et[λt+1](1 + rt) (22)
In the steady state, this will reduce to γ
λ
(1 + r) = 1 which means that we can
pin down analytically the stochastic return to be r = λ
γ
− 1. In our simulations, the
interest rate will be set to the 3-year (pre-crisis) average of 2.5%.
Finally, we have the two additional constraints in this model: the cash-in-advance
and the utilization costs. The cash in advance can be re-written from I.23 as:
ϑt ≥ 1
1− Nt
Et[St+1]Kt+1
(23)
,and the utilization cost function has again the following functional form:
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (24)
Final Good Producers
Continuing our analysis with the retailers, they maximize their profits:
max
Pt(j)
ΩR = E0
∞∑
k=0
θkΛt,k[Pt(j)yt(j)− P ∗t yt(j)−
κp
2
[
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− pilpt−1pi1−lp ]2Ptyt] (25)
subject to:
yt(j) = [
Pt(j)
Pt
]−
y
t yt (26)
following Gali (2008) on page 5 and Kwok Ping Tsang (2008) pn page 6, we can
substitute the constraint in the objective function. The FOC with respect to price
is:
θkλkt [(1− yt )(Pt(j)−
y
tP
yt
t )yt − (−yt )P ∗t (Pt(j)−
y
tP
yt
t )yt − κP [
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− pilpt−1pi1−lp ]
1
Pt−1(j)
Ptyt]− βt+1Et[ Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− pilpt pi1−lp ]− [
Pt+1(j)
P 2t (j)
Pt+1yt+1] = 0 (27)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have that all j’s are equal, and so we can reduce
the FOC to:
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(1− yt )yt + ytP ∗t P 1t yt − κP [
Pt
Pt−1
− pilpt−1pi1−lp ]
Pt
Pt−1
yt]
+ βt+1Et[
λkt+1
λkt
κP [
Pt+1
Pt
− pilpt pi1−lp ]− [
P 2t+1(j)
P 2t (j)
Pt+1yt+1] = 0 (28)
Dividing the last expression by yt and using the fact that
P ∗t
Pt
= 1
Xt
, we get:
1− yt +
yt
xt
−κP (pit−pilpt−1pi1−lp)pit+βt+1Et[
λkt+1
λkt
κP (pit+1−pilpt−1pi1−lp)(pit+1)2
yt+1
yt
] = 0
(29)
We can aggregate across retailers, and express their profits (with Calvo pricing)
as:
jRt = yt[1−
1
xt
− κP
2
(pit − pilpt−1pi1−lp)2] (30)
Next, we go on to describe the full equilibrium dynamics.
2.2.2 Aggregation
We aggregate amongst capital good producers, entrepreneurs, and retailers. Because
capital good producers and entrepreneurs are homogeneous within group, we can
easily aggregate in a symmetric equilibrium to a representative capital good pro-
ducer, and a representative entrepreneur. Apart from the timing of price setting,
retailers are also homogeneous, and therefore in a symmetric equilibrium, all ’j’s’
will be equal. The aggregate price evolution is expressed above, and the total profits
of the sector are:
jRt = yt[1−
Pt
Pwt
] = yt[1− 1
Xt
] (31)
We could have introduced a cost for differentiating goods in the retailer’s objec-
tive function. However, around steady state this cost would disappear from the the
optimal price and the profit function, and so would be equivalent to this expression.
2.2.3 Market clearing
The (de-centralised) market clearing conditions in this model are:
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In our calibrations, we will normalize the ξ’s, which implies that rkt = ut.
λt = γt(1 + rt) + Et[λt+1](1 + rt) (22)
In the steady state, this will reduce to γ
λ
(1 + r) = 1 which means that we can
pin down analytically the stochastic return to be r = λ
γ
− 1. In our simulations, the
interest rate will be se to he 3-year (pre-crisis) average of 2.5%.
Finally, we have the two additional const aints in this model: the cash-in-advance
and the utilization costs. The cash in advance can be re-written from I.23 s:
ϑt ≥ 1
1− Nt
Et[St+1]Kt+1
(23)
,and the utilization cost function has again the following functional form:
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (24)
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In a symmetric equilibrium, we have that all j’s are equal, and so we can reduce
the FOC to:
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The market for capital services clears when the demand for capital by en-
trepreneurs equals the supply by capital good producers:
stkt+1 = qt[kt − (1− δ)kt−1]; st
qt
> 0 (32)
The market for labor clears if entrepreneurs’ demand for labor equals labor
supply at the wage level set by households:
yt
lt
1
ct
xt =
1
η
lt (33)
The left-hand side is the marginal product of labor weighted by the marginal
utility of consumption. In equilibrium, it varies proportionally with the retail-over-
wholesale good markup.
The market for deposits clears:
dt = bt (34)
The market for external financing clears:
bt
Et[r
s
t+1]
Rt+1
= s
Nt+1
St+1Kt+1
(35)
The total amount of financing supplied to entrepreneurs is equal to the quantity
of demand deposits multiplied by a risk premium on those deposits (reflecting the
financial contracting problem involved in the financial accelerator model), and this
is equal to the demand for capital by entrepreneurs taking into account the collateral
constraint they face.
Aggregating across goods markets in this economy, we get that the final re-
source constraint is:
yt = ct+gt+st[kt−(1−δ)kt1 ]+ψ(ut)kt−1+Adjt+µ
∫ 
0
ωdFωRstSt−1Kt (36)
where Adjt are the total adjustment costs in production, i.e. [1 − κi2 [ itit−1 −
1]2]it and ψ(ut)kt−1 is the usable capital in the production of goods. The last
term, µ
∫ 
0
ωdFωRstSt−1Kt reflects the aggregate monitoring costs in the financial
16
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contracting problem between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries.
2.2.4 Log-Linearization and Model Solution
The model is log-linearized around a (non-stochastic) steady state. This means
that we cannot capture nonlinearities, such as precautionary savings, buffer-stock
behaviours, or state-dependent outcomes. We apply a linear approximation method
to our solution which means that our perturbation only works around the steady
state. The system of log-linearized equations is provided in the appendix.
2.3 Calibrations and simulations
Table II.1 reports the full list of calibrated parameters. Most of these are calibrated
following the values given in BGG (1999), and are standard to the literature. There
are only a few minor differences. Our consumption-output ratio in the steady state
includes both the private and public consumption, hence why the value is slightly
larger in our calibration.21We calibrate the share of capital in production, α to 0.20.
For robustness purposes, we also tried with α = 0.30, α = 0.35, the other common
values in the literature, but no noticeable differences were observed. Finally, in order
to replicate the stylized facts of the asset price wedge (including the market and
book values) of Gerba (2014), we parameterize ν, the elasticity of EFP to leverage
to 0.13. It is slightly higher than the 0.05 in the original BGG model, but follows
the estimation results for the US of Caglar (2012), and it represents well the post-
2000 period, when the leverage of firms increased drastically, and so the sensitivity
of financial lending rates to leverage was high.22In the same wave, we consider an
accommodative monetary policy, replicating thus the Fed’s stance during most of
the past decade, and use the Taylor rule parameters of 0.2 for the feedback coefficient
on expected inflation, ζ along with a value of 0.95 for the smoothing parameter.
Borrowing from the insights in the corporate finance literature, and the US
estimation results for the residual earnings process of Caglar (2012), we set the
value of the autoregressive process of residual earnings equal to 0.67. Lastly, the
weight on expected evolution of the economy is 0.18.
21In the canonical BGG (1999) model, the C/Y ratio is calibrated to 0.568. However, if we also
include the public consumption in that ratio, which they calibrate to 0.2, the value is almost the
same to our, which we calibrate to 0.806.
22See Gerba (2015) on the balance sheet changes and the financial exposure that firms underwent
during the past decade.
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The parameters specific to this model are set to standard values in the literature.
The share of capital in the production α is set to 0.30 as in Boissay et al (2013).
Following Christiano et al (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) nd Gerali et al
(2010), we set the capital depreciation rate δ to 0.025. The elasticity of the capital
utilization adjustment cost function ψ(it) is parametrized to 0.5 as in Smets and
Wouters (2007).23
To conclude, the parameters of the function determining adjustment costs for
capacity utilization (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2) are set to (0.8, 0.3, 0.25) in order to capture the es-
timation results of Smets and Wouters (2005) who find that the capital utilization
adjustment costs are between 0.14 and 0.38 (Euro Area 1983-2002) and 0.21 and
0.42 (US 1983-2002), with a mean of 0.25 (Euro Area) and 0.31 (US). If we nor-
malize ut to 1 (as in Christiano et al (2005), Miao et al (2013) or Auernheimer and
Trupkin (2014)), then the cost for utilizing capital will be 0.20 (1 − ξ0), which is
well within the estimated intervals of Smets and Wouters (2005).
The standard error of all shocks is, for reasons of comparability with the be-
havioural model, set to 0.5. The autoregressive components of the various shocks
are set to standard values in the literature For the monetary policy shock, it is set
to 0.90 and for technology shock to 0.99. For the financial shock, and the shock to
utilization costs, we set the AR-component to 0 and only consider a 1-period white
noise shock. This is because we do not find convincing evidence in the literature for
incorporating a persistence parameter in these shocks.
3 Animal Spirits and Credit Cycles on the Supply
Side
The next task is to incorporate the same supply-side mechanisms and financial
frictions in the behavioural model. The only difference will be that the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis is highly violated in the behavioural model.24We motivate this
23This is equivalent to setting a κi equal to the estimated range (10.18− 12.81) as in Gerali et
al (2010).
24Notice that, just as in De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), the share price is derived from the
stable growth Gordon discounted dividiend model: St =
Et[ ¯Λt+1]
Rst
where ¯Λt+1 are expected future
dividends net of the discount rate, Rst . Agents in this set-up assume that the 1-period ahead
forecast of dividends is a fraction f of the nominal GDP one period ahead, and constant thereafter
in t+1, t+2, etc. Since nominal GDP consists of a real and inflation component, agents make
forecast of future output gap and inflation according to the specification in subsection 3.3. This
forecast is reevaluated in each period. As a result, in order to get the expected (stock) market
18
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cognitive limitation of the agents by the fact that understanding complex economic
systems requires agents to acquire a large amount of data and cognitive ability.
This is very costly so it dis-incentivizes a full acquisition of these resources at each
t. Therefore agents optimize using limited information regarding the variables in the
model that they don’t directly control (or markets they do not directly engage in).
This will enable us to compare the relative importance of agents’ beliefs in generat-
ing aggregate (non-linear) dynamics, both qualitatively and quantitatively.25In what
follows, we will only expose the parts that are different from the DSGE extensions
above.26
3.1 Capital
Capital is homogeneous in this model. The stock of capital accumulates according
to the following process:
Kt = (1− δψ(ut)Kt−1 +Ψ( It
It−1
)It (37)
where Ψ( It
It−1
)It = [1− κ2 ( itit−1 −1)2]it is the adjustment cost function.27κt denotes
the cost for adjusting investment. Including adjustment costs of investment in the
production of capital solves the so-called ’investment puzzle’ and produces the hump-
shaped investment in response to a monetary policy shock (see Smets and Wouters,
2007).
3.2 Aggregate dynamics
Since we have introduced a production economy in the baseline behavioural model,
we al o need to adapt the ggregate quations. First we n ed to link the capit l
accumulation with the real interest rate. Linking the investment demand equation
from DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015):
price, the expected output gap and inflation needs to be defined. That is the reason why stock
markets depend on (imperfect) forecasts and thus lead easily to market sentiments. Hence at a
deeper level, we are evaluating a fully rational expectations-consistent stock market to a market
which is governed by imperfect information and market sentiment.
25One of the core questions will of course be whether it is necessary to accude to strict bounded
rationality in order to create realistic non-linearities in the transmission of shocks and asymmetric
business cycle fluctuations. The empirical fit is the next step in the comparison.
26For a full model description, we refer to the baseline behavioural macro model in Macchiarelli
and DeGrauwe (2015) and DeGrauwe (2008, 2012).
27The function is calibrated in such a way that it matches the log-linearized expression for
capital accumulation in the DSGE model: Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + δIt.
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from DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015):
price, the expected output gap and inflation needs to be defined. That is the reason why stock
markets depend on (imperfect) forecasts and thus lead easily to market sentiments. Hence at a
deeper level, we are evaluating a fully rational expectations-consistent stock market to a market
which is governed by imperfect information and market sentiment.
25One of the core questions will of course be whether it is necessary to accude to strict bounded
rationality in order to create realistic non-linearities in the transmission of shocks and asymmetric
business cycle fluctuations. The empirical fit is the next step in the comparison.
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cognitive limitation of the agents by the fact that understanding complex economic
systems requires agents to acquire a large amount of data and cognitive ability.
This is very costly so it dis-incentivizes a full acquisition of these resources at each
t. Therefore agents optimize using limited information regarding the variables in the
model that they don’t directly control (or markets they do not directly engage in).
This will enable us to compare the relative importance of agents’ beliefs in generat-
ing aggregate (non-linear) dynamics, both qualitatively and quantitatively.25In what
follows, we will only expose the parts that are different from the DSGE extensions
above.26
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it = i(ρ t = e1E¯tyt+1 + e2(ρ− E¯tpit+1); e2 < 0 (38)
with the aggregate capital accumulation 37, we find that the relation between
c pit and the real at is:
kt = (1−δ)kt−1+Ψ( it
it−1
)i(ρ)t = (1−δ)kt−1+Ψ( it
it−1
)e1Etyt+1+e2(rt+xt−Etpit+1); e2 < 0
(39)
Incorporating a supply side into the aggregate equations - by means of equations
I.18, 37 and 4 - gives:
yt = a1Etyt+1+(1−a1)yt−1+a2(rt−Etpit+1)+(a2+a3)xt+(a1−a2)ψ(ut)kt+Adjtt; (a1−a2) > 0
(40)
The aggregate demand now also depends on the usable capital in the production,
utkt but discounted for the cost of financing (xt). Christiano et al. (2005), Smets
and Wouters (2007), and Gerali et al. (2010) arrive at the same resource constraint
expression in their models. There is an adjustment cost in investment, which we
capture by Adjt. However, it will be calibrated in such a way to equal δ, as in the
DSGE model.
The reader will notice that aggregate demand also depends on the external fi-
nance (or risk) premium xt. This is a reduced form expression for investment, since
investment is governed directly by this premium, and therefore it is the dependent
variable (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) for a derivation of this term).
The aggregate supply (AS) equation is obtained from the price descrimination
problem of retailers (monopolistically competitive):
pit = b1Etpit+1 + (1− b1)pit−1 + b2yt + νt (41)
As explained in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), b1 = 1 corresponds to the
New-Keynesian version of AS with Calvo-pricing (Woodford (2003), Branch and
McGaugh (2009)). Setting 0 < b1 < 1 we incorporate some price inertia in the vein
of Gali and Gertler (1999). Equally, the parameter b2 varies between 0 and ∞ and
reflects the degree of price rigidities in the context of a Calvo pricing assumption
(DeGrauwe, 2012). A value of b2 = 0 corresponds to complete price rigidity and
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b2 = ∞ to perfect price flexibility (firms have a probability of 1 of changing prices
in period t).
3.3 Expectations formation and learning
Under rational expectations, the expectational term will equal its realized value in
the next period, i.e. EtXt+1 = Xt+1, denoting generically by Xt any variable in
the model. However, as anticipated above, we depart from this assumption in this
framework by considering bounded rationality as in DeGrauwe (2011, 2012). Expec-
tations are replaced by a convex combination of heterogeneous expectation operators
Etyt+1 = E˜tyt+1 and Etpit+1 = E˜tpit+1. In particular, agents do not have control over
(aggregate) output and inflation and therefore make imperfect forecast of those two
variables.28 They forecast using two alternative forecasting rules: fundamentalist
rule vs. extrapolative rule. Under the fundamentalist rule, agents are assumed to
use the steady-state value of the output gap - y∗, here normalized to zero against
a naive forecast based on the gap’s latest available observation (extrapolative rule).
Equally for inflation, fundamentalist agents are assumed to base their expectations
on the central bank’s target - pi∗ against the extrapolatists who naively base their
forecast on a random walk approach.29We can formally express the fundamentalists
in inflation and output forecasting as:
E˜ft pit+1 = pi
∗ (42)
E˜ft yt+1 = y∗ (43)
and the extrapolists in both cases as:
E˜et pit+1 = θpit−1 (44)
E˜et yt+1 = θyt−1 (45)
This particular form of adaptive expectations has previously been modelled by
Pesaran (1987), Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), and Branch and McGough (2009),
28The definition of agents excludes the central bank. Firms ’control’ output insofar that they
control their production of final goods, but do not have an oversight over the demand-side.
29The latest available observation is the best forecast of the future.
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amongst others, in the literature. Setting θ = 1 captures the ”naive” agents (as they
have a strong belief in history dependence), while a θ < 1 or θ > 1 represents an
”adaptive” or an ”extrapolative” agent (Brock and Hommes, 1998). For reasons of
tractability, we set θ = 1 in this model.
Note that for the sake of consistency with the DSGE model, all variables here
are expressed in gaps. Focusing on their cyclical component makes the model sym-
metric with respect to the steady state (see Harvey and Jaeger, 1993). Therefore, as
DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) show, it is not necessary to include a zero lower
bound constraint in the model since a negative interest rate should be understood
as a negative interest rate gap. In general terms, the equilibrium forecast/target for
each variable will be equal to its’ setady state value.
Next, selection of the forecasting rule depends on the (historical) performance of
the various rules given by a publically available goodness-of-fit measure, the mean
square forecasting error (MSFE). After the time ‘t’ realization is revealed, the two
predictors are evaluated ex post using MSFE and new fractions of agent types are
determined. These updated fractions are used to determine the next period (ag-
gregate) forecasts of output-and inflation gaps, and so on. Agents’ rationality con-
sists therefore in choosing the best-performing predictor using the updated fitness
measure. There is a strong empirical motivation for inserting this type of switch-
ing mechanism amongst different forecasting rules (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli
(2015) for a brief discussion of the empirical literature, Frankel and Froot (1990)
for a discussion of fundamentalist behaviour, and Roos and Schmidt (2012), Cogley
(2002), Cogley and Sargent (2007) and Cornea, Hommes and Massaro (2013) for
evidence of extrapolative behaviour, in particular for inflation forecasts).
The aggregate market forecasts of output gap and inflation is obtained as a
weighted average of each rule:
E˜tpit+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t pit+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t pit+1 (46)
E˜tyt+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t yt+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t yt+1 (47)
where αft is the weighted average of fundamentalists, and α
e
t that of the ex-
trapolists. These shares are time-varying and based on the dynamic predictor se-
lection. The mechanism allows to switch between the two forecasting rules based
on MSFE / utility of the two rules, and increase (decrease) the weight of one rule
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over the other at each t. Assuming that the utilities of the two alternative rules
have a deterministic and a random component (with a log-normal distribution as
in Manski and McFadden (1981) or Anderson et al (1992)), the two weights can
be defined based on each period utility for each forecast Uxi,t, i = (y, pi), x = (f, e)
according to:
αfpi,t =
exp(γU fpi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(48)
αfy,t =
exp(γU fy,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(49)
αepi,t ≡ 1− αfpi,t =
exp(γU epi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(50)
αey,t ≡ 1− αfy,t =
exp(γU ey,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(51)
,where the utilities are defined as:
U fpi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2pit−k−1]2 (52)
U fy,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2yt−k−1]2 (53)
U epi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜et−k−2pit−k−1]2 (54)
U ey,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜et−k−2yt−k−1]2 (55)
and wk = (ρ
k(1 − ρ)) (with 0 < ρ < 1) are gemoetrically declining weights
adapted to include the degree of forgetfulness in the model (DeGrauwe, 2012). γ is
a parameter measuring the extent to which the deterministic component of utility
determines actual choice. A value of 0 implies a perfectly stochastic utility. In that
case, agents decide to be one type or the other simply by tossing a coin, implying a
probability of each type equalizing to 0.5. On the other hand, γ =∞ imples a fully
deterministic utility, and the probability of using the fundamentalist (extrapolative)
rule is either 1 or 0. Another way of interpreting γ is in terms of learning from past
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performance: γ = 0 imples zero willingness to learn, while it increases with the size
of the parameter, i.e. 0 < γ <∞.
As mentioned above, agents will subject the performance of rules to a fit mea-
sure and choose the one that performs best. In that sense, agents are ’boundedly’
rational and learn from their misstakes. More importantly, this discrete choice mech-
anism allows to endogenize the distribution of heterogeneous agents over time with
the proportion of each agent using a certain rule (parameter α). The approach is
consistent with the empirical studies (Cornea et al, 2012) who show that the dis-
tribution of heterogeneous agents varies in reaction to economic volatility (Carroll
(2003), Mankiw et al (2004)).
3.4 Firm equity
To complete the model, we need to characterize the evolution of net worth. In
DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), it is shown that:
nf,mt =
1
τ
(LDt−1 + it) (56)
and
nf,mt = n¯tSt (57)
,where n¯t represents the number of (time-varying) shares of the firm and St is
the current (stock) market price. Combining the two, we get that the number of
shares is:
n¯t =
1
τ
(LDt−1 + it)
St
(58)
Inserting the investment demand equation i(ρ)t = e1E˜t(yt+1) + e2(rt + xt −
E˜t(pit+1)) from DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) into the expression above, we
get:
Stn¯t =
1
τ
(LDt−1 + e1E˜t(yt+1) + e2(rt + xt − E˜t(pit+1))) (59)
We observe three things. First, the net capital (or loans) the firm has after
repaying the cost of borrowing is scaled by the inverse leverage ratio. The more
it borrows, the smaller will be its equity in the next period. Second, a higher
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(expected) production increases its revenues and therefore the capital level (via the
capital accumulation function). However, a portion of the production is financed
by external funds and thus it will need to pay a cost for those funds, represented
by the risky interest rate rt + xt. However, the more leveraged the firm is, the
higher the downpayment on loans and therefore the more ’exposed’ the firm will be
in recessions. Third, a higher expected inflation implies a reduction in the cost of
external financing. For a given level of leverage, this reduces firm’s debt exposure
today and permits her, ceteris paribus to take on additional loans. Finally, note that
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
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pit−1
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
+
+
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

rt−1
Dt−1
nbt−1
+

1 0 0 0 0
0 a2 0 1 (a1 − a2)
0 ψ−1τe2 1 0 0
0 −d3 0 −(1− d1) 0
0 0 0 0 1


ηt
ut
ϑ
t
ucft

Using matrix notation, we can write this as: AZt = BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 +DXt−1 + Evt.
We can solve forZt by inverting: Zt = A
−1(BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 +DXt−1 + Evt)
and assuring A to be non-singular.
Solution for the interest rate rt is obtained by substituting yt and pit into the
Taylor rule. Investments, utilization costs, bank equities, loans, labor and deposits
are determined by the model solutions for output gap, inflation, financing spread,
savings and capital.30
Expectation terms with a tilde E˜t implies that we do not impose rational ex-
pectations. Using the system of equations above, if we substitute the law of motion
consistent with heterogeneity of agents (fundamentalists and extrapolators), then
we can show that the endogenous variables depend linearly on lagged endogenous
variables, their equilibrium forecasts and current exogenous shocks.
Note that for the forecasts of output and inflation gap, the forward looking
terms in equations 39, 40 and 41 are substituted by the discrete choice mechanism
in 46. For a comparison of solutions in the ’bounded rationality’ model and rational
expectations framework, see section 3.1 in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015).
3.6 Calibration and simulations
To simplify the discussion, we will only present the calibrations of the parameters
that are new to this model. A full parameter list can be found in Appendix.
30However, capital, savings and the external financing spread do not need to be forecasted as
these do not affect the dynamics of the model (i.e. there is no structure of higher order beliefs as
LIE does not hold in the behavioural model). See section 3.1 in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015)
for comparison of solutions under rational expectations and bounded rationality (”heuristics”).
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In li e with De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), we calibrate the aggregate
d m d parameters (d1, 2, e1) to (0.5, 0.15, 0.1) which is consistent with standard
ma roecon mic simulation results. τ (or a fi ms’ average leverage ratio) is again set
to 1.43, following Pesaran and Xu (2013), and κ (or banks’ equi y ratio) is, foll w
Gerali et al (2010), set to 0.09.
The parameters specific to this model are set to standard values in the literature.
The share of c pital in the production α is set to 0.30 as in Bo ssay et al (2013).
Following Christiano et al (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and Gerali et al
(2010), we set the capital depreciation rate δ to 0.025. The elasticity of the capital
utilization adjustment cost function ψ(ut) is parametrized to 0.5 as in Smets and
Wouters (2007).31
The sensitivity of capital (or investment) to changes in the real interest rate e2
is, in line with the empirical evidence, set to e2 < 0. To conclude, the parameters of
the function determining adjust ent costs for capacity utilizatio (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2) are set
to (0.8, 0.3, 0.25) in order to capture the estimation results of Smets and Wouters
(2005) who find that the capital utilization adjustment costs are between 0.14 and
0.38 (Euro Area 1983-2002) and 0.21 and 0.42 (US 1983-2002), with a mean of 0.25
(Euro Area) and 0.31 (US). If we normalize ut to 1 (as in Christiano et al (2005),
Miao et al (2013) or Auernheimer and Trupkin (2014)), then the cost for utilizing
capital will be 0.20 (1 − ξ0), which is well within the estimated intervals of Smets
and Wouters (2005).
All shocks, except to the capital utilization, are parametrized as white noise
which means that their autoregressive component is set to 0. Likewise the standard
deviations of shocks are set to 0.5 across the entire spectrum.32
4 Quantitative results in the DSGE model
Analysis of the quantitative results is split into three parts. First, we will analyze a
selected number of impulse responses. This will be followed by a moment-matching
exercise. Finally, we will conclude the section with a variance decomposition exer-
cise in order to understand the shocks that are most impoartant in explaining the
variations in the model. In particular, we will be interested to see whther the DSGE
31This is equivalent to setting a κi equal to the estimated range (10.18− 12.81) as in Gerali et
al (2010).
32The AR-component of the shock to capital utilization cost is set conservatively to 0.1, just
enough to generate some persistence in the capital cost structure.
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In line with De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), we calibrate the aggregate
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Wouters (2007).31
The sensitivity of capital (or investment) to changes in the real interest rate e2
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(Euro Area) and 0.31 (US). If we normalize ut to 1 (as in Christiano et al (2005),
Miao et al (2013) or Auernheimer and Trupkin (2014)), then the cost for utilizing
capital will be 0.20 (1 − ξ0), which is well within the estimated intervals of Smets
and Wouters (2005).
All shocks, except to the capital utilization, are parametrized as white noise
which means that their autoregressive component is set to 0. Likewise the standard
deviations of shocks are set to 0.5 across the entire spectrum.32
4 Quantitative results in the DSGE model
Analysis of the quantitative results is split into three parts. First, we will analyze a
selected number of impulse responses. This will be followed by a moment-matching
exercise. Finally, we will conclude the section with a variance decomposition exer-
cise in order to understand the shocks that are most impoartant in explaining the
variations in the model. In particular, we will be interested to see whther the DSGE
31This is equivalent to setting a κi equal to the estimated range (10.18− 12.81) as in Gerali et
al (2010).
32The AR-component of the shock to capital utilization cost is set conservatively to 0.1, just
enough to generate some persistence in the capital cost structure.
27
In line with De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), we calibrate the aggregate
demand parameters (d1, d2, e1) to (0.5, 0.15, 0.1) which is consistent with standard
macroeconomic simulation results. τ (or a firms’ average leverage ratio) is again set
to 1.43, following Pesaran and Xu (2013), and κ (or banks’ equity ratio) is, following
Gerali et al (2010), set to 0.09.
The parameters specific to this model are set to standard values in the literature.
The share of capital in the production α is set to 0.30 as in Boissay et al (2013).
Following Christiano et al (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and Gerali et al
(2010), we set the capital depreciation rate δ to 0.025. The elasticity of the capital
utilization adjustment cost function ψ(ut) is parametrized to 0.5 as in Smets and
Wouters (2007).31
The sensitivity of capital (or investment) to changes in the real interest rate e2
is, in line with the empirical evidence, set to e2 < 0. To conclude, the parameters of
the function determining adjustment costs for capacity utilization (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2) are set
to (0.8, 0.3, 0.25) in order to capture the estimation results of Smets and Wouters
(2005) who find that the capital utilization adjustment costs are between 0.14 and
0.38 (Euro Area 1983-2002) and 0.21 and 0.42 (US 1983-2002), with a mean of 0.25
(Euro Area) and 0.31 (US). If we normalize ut to 1 (as in Christiano et al (2005),
Miao et al (2013) or Auernheimer and Trupkin (2014)), then the cost for utilizing
capital will be 0.20 (1 − ξ0), which is well within the estimated intervals of Smets
and Wouters (2005).
All shocks, except to the capital utilization, are parametrized as white noise
which means that their autoregressive component is set to 0. Likewise the standard
deviations of shocks are set to 0.5 across the entire spectrum.32
4 Quantitative results in the DSGE model
Analysis of the quantitative results is split into three parts. First, we will analyze a
selected number of impulse responses. This will be followed by a moment-matching
exercise. Finally, we will conclude the section with a variance decomposition exer-
cise in order to understand the shocks that are most impoartant in explaining the
variations in the model. In particular, we will be interested to see whther the DSGE
31This is equivalent to setting a κi equal to the estimated range (10.18− 12.81) as in Gerali et
al (2010).
32The AR-component of the shock to capital utilization cost is set conservatively to 0.1, just
enough to generate some persistence in the capital cost structure.
27
model is capable of capturing the stylized fact of financial shocks being the most
important source of variability in the US (and EU) economies, transmitted via the
supply sid , described abov .
4.1 Forcing variables
Next we will examine the impulse respo ses to two supply shocks (TFP and uti-
lization rate), two financial shocks (firm financing costs and asset price wedge), and
one monetary shock (monetary policy). The five shocks have the following model
structure:
• (Positive) technology (TFP) shock, zt
yt = ztztK
αL1−α (60)
,where zt is a white noise shock to the technology factor in the Cobb-Douglas
technology function. We model the autoregressive structure of the TFP shock
as:
zt = ρ
z
t zt−1 + 
z (61)
• (Negative) shock to firm financing costs, rk, which we introduce in the cost
of external financing equation:
rkt = (1− )(yt − kt − xt) + st − st−1 + rk (62)
Another way of interpreting this shock is to consider it as (an unexpected)
improvement in the financial condition of firms, which relaxes their cost of
external financing.
• Standard (negative) monetary policy shock ():
rt = rt−1 + γpit + (1− γ)yt +  (63)
,a shock to capital utilization rate:
• (Positive) shock to utilization cost, uct, in the utilization cost function:
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 + uct (64)
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variation in the model. In p rt cular, we will be inte est d to see whther the DSGE
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model is capable of capturing the stylized fact of financial shocks being the most
important source of variability in the US (and EU) economies, transmitted via the
supply side, described above.
4.1 Forcing variables
Next we will examine the impulse responses to two supply shocks (TFP and uti-
lization rate), two financial shocks (firm financing costs and asset price wedge), and
one monetary shock (monetary policy). The five shocks have the following model
structure:
• (Positive) technology (TFP) shock, zt
yt = ztztK
αL1−α (60)
,where zt is a white noise shock to the technology factor in the Cobb-Douglas
technology function. We model the autoregressive structure of the TFP shock
as:
zt = ρ
z
t zt−1 + 
z (61)
• (Negative) shock to firm financing costs, rk, which we introduce in the cost
of external financing equation:
rkt = (1− )(yt − kt − xt) + st − st−1 + rk (62)
Another way of interpreting this shock is to consider it as (an unexpected)
improvement in the financial condition of firms, which relaxes their cost of
external financing.
• Standard (negative) monetary policy shock ():
rt = rt−1 + γpit + (1− γ)yt +  (63)
,a shock to capital utilization rate:
• (Positive) shock to utilization cost, uct, in the utilization cost function:
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 + uct (64)
28,where uct has the following AR structure:
uct = ρucuct−1 + uc (65)
Finally, to examine a full boom-bust cycle in asset prices, we introduce a second
financial shock to our model. More specifically, we introduce an exogenous
disturbance to the residual earnings equation:
• (Positive) shock to residual earnings, re:
ret = ρreret−1 + (χ)(Et[yt+1] + nt − Et[rt+1]) + re (66)
The shock can be viewed as unexpected news (good or bad) regarding future
economic performance that arrives, and influences stock market investments
in that period. We label it a wedge shock.
and uc is a white noise shock. In our simulations, we calibrate the AR component
ρuc to 0.1 in order to strictly limit the possibility of the shock driving the model
dynamics. However, a simple white noise utilization cost shock is excessively short-
lived, and does not allow us to study the endogenous dynamics in full. All the white
noise shock parameters (, rk, re, z and uc) are calibrated to 0.5.
Remember that the standard errors of all shocks are calibrated to 0.5. Later on,
this will allow us to make a qualitative as well as quantitative comparison between
the two model responses.
4.2 Impulse response analysis
To maintain the focus, we will only discuss the TFP and financial shocks in this
section. For a discussion of the other 3 shocks, please refer to the Appendix. Note
that the numbers on the x-axis indicate the number of quarters.
We will also include a comparison of the results in the current framework with
model versions where the stock market and interaction term are omitted (original
BGG, 1999), or a version where only the stock market mechanism is included (Gerba,
2014). For sake of comparability, we have calibrated the aforementioned models in
the same way as for the current model, as well as applied the same shock structure
and parametrization.
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4.2.1 Productivity shock
Figure II.1 depicts the responses to an expansionary TFP shock. An increase in
productivity of 0.5% results in an expansion in production and sales, which increases
the rentability of the firm. This pushes up its market value by 0.8%, its net worth
by 1.75%, marginal costs down by 0.2% and labour demand up by 0.8%. Moreover,
because the profitability outlook of the firm is positive, the CGP become less worried
about the repayment of their capital sold, which relaxes the down payment share
by 2.5% (i.e. less of the capital purchased has to be pre-paid). The book value
of the firm also goes up by 0.5%. However, since the profitability of the firm is
expected to remain high for multiple periods ahead, and its investment demand
is highly positive and stable (initially at 3.5%, and then 0.8% after 16 quarters),
market value should be higher than the book value for several periods ahead. That
is exactly what we observe in residual earnings, which increases by up to 0.7% in
quarter 4. The effects on inflation are, however, non-standard. While a positive
TFP shock reduces inflation, the demand effects from an expansion in investment,
stock prices, consumption (0.5%) and external financing are so strong that they
offset the initial fall, which results in a final increase of inflation by 0.04%. This
triggers a positive (albeit marginal) increase in the policy rate of 0.005%, resulting
in a very short-lived inflation. Therefore, the real rate falls (-0.018%). Lastly, the
total effect of this supply-side expansion is that output expands by 1%, and remains
above its steady-state level for multiple quarters.
To quantify the importance and the propagating power of the mechanism de-
veloped in this paper, we briefly compare the responses in the current model with
the benchmark BGG (1999), and the Gerba (2014) extension. Judging from Figure
II.2, one can clearly see that by omitting a (stock) market valuation mechanism
of firms and an explicit interaction between supply-side and financial markets, the
expansionary effects from a TFP shock are considerably smaller. Net worth of firm
increases 3 times less (or 0.55%), marginal costs drop 50 times less (or -0.004%), and
contrary to above, labour demand falls (since the TFP effect is entirely on employing
capital more effectively). As a result, the (book) value of firm increases by less than
a half (or 0.2%) and investment demand more than 3 times less (or 1%) compared
to the full model. Because of this weaker transmission in the canonical BGG (1999)
model, inflation falls instead (by 0.0015%), which pushes the policy rate down and
the real rate up, and output increases by 50% less (or just 0.5% above the steady
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state level).
Even when we include the (stock) market valuation mechanism, but exclude
the explicit interaction term between the stock market, the financial market and
the supply-side (as in Gerba, 2014), the responses are weaker. More specifically,
while the responses in Gerba (2014) and this model are qualitatively the same, the
magnitudes of the responses in the current model are, on average, 15% higher. So,
for instance, in Gerba (2014) market value of firms rises by 0.6%, net worth by
1.55%, marginal costs down by 0.15%, and labor demand up by 0.5%. In the same
vein, investment rises by only 2.9%, inflation increases by 0.03%, the real rate falls
by 0.01%, and output rises by 0.9%.33
4.2.2 Financial shock
The second shock we consider is a 0.5% reduction in the cost of external financing
for firms. The impulse responses are depicted in Figure II.8. The immediate impact
is that, via equation 62, the return on capital rises by 3% and the real rate falls
by nearly 0.1%, which makes borrowing and investment much more attractive for
entrepreneurs. They will therefore borrow up to the new maximum, and increase
their investment by 10%. Moreover, firms will produce more since their marginal
costs have gone down by 0.8% and their demand for labor up by 2.3% so to keep the
capital-labor ratio constant. Hence capital increases by 1.1%. Higher production
and investment imples a higher net worth in the future, which increases by 6.5%.
As a result of the positive outlook on firm finances and its realized cash-flows, both
the market and book value of firms increase. The market value rises by 2.5%,
meanwhile the book value by 1.8%. Since the expectations of future firm profits and
investment returns are high, these are additionally priced in today’s market value,
which at the peak (after 4 quarters) pushes the residual earnings up to 1.75% above
the steady-state level. The increased activity results in an increase in inflation by
0.18%, which forces the monetary authority to respond by raising the interest rate
by 0.03%. However, the final effect on real interest rate is for it to fall by 0.08%.
As a consequence, expected consumption falls by 0.1% and increase only when the
real rate turns positive. The accumulated rise is, nevertheless, small compared to
investment, since consumption does not rise at any point by more than 0.15%.
Note the (positive) supply side effects that a (positive) financial shock has in this
33For the sake of space, we have not reported the impulse responses of the Gerba (2014) model.
However, should you wish to see them, please do not hesitate to contact the authors.
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framework. Not only does it increase production, reduce the marginal input costs,
and increase the market value of firm, but it also relaxes the front payment share
by 9%. The financial position and the production posibility of entrepreneurs has
improved, which means that CGP are less worried about entrepreneurs repayment-
status, and therefore require less of pre-payment. All of this results in an output
increase of 2%. That is twice the expansion orginated from a supply shock only.
Once again, let us compare the impulse responses to a canonical BGG (1999)
model. These are depicted in Figure II.9. It is clear that the expansion is attenuated
in the benchmark version. Return on capital increases by 1% and the real rate falls
by 0.015%. The consequence is a much smaller (positive) borrowing gap, and so the
increase in investment is 4 times smaller than the one observed in the full model
(i.e. 2.5%). In addition the rise in production is also significantly smaller. The fall
in marginal costs is 5 times smaller (0.15%) and the rise in the demand for labor
4 times smaller (0.6%). As a consequence, net worth increases only by 2.25% and
the (book) value by 0.6% (a third of the values in the full model). The resulting
inflation rise is 6 times smaller, the same as for the real interest rate (0.03% and
-0.015%)34The aggregate effect on output is that it increases by 0.45%, or by less
than a fourth to the full model.
Including a (stock) market strengthens the (financial) shock transmission mech-
anism, even if less significantly than in the full model. The impulse responses are on
average 25% lower in the Gerba (2014) extension compared to the model here. On
the financial side, the return on capital increases by 2% and the real rate falls by
0.08%. On the demand side, investment increases by 8%, (market) value of capital
by 2%, book value by 1.3%, and net worth by 5.8%. On the supply side, marginal
production costs fall by 0.6%, labor demand increases by 2% and capital by 1%.
The aggregate effect on inflation and output is that they rise by a third and a fifth
less than in the full model. These observations show that including the interaction
between stock markets, external financing and the supply side does not only amplify
the shocks, but that the amplification is stronger when the economy faces a financial
shock compared to a real shock only.35Moreover, under the current framework finan-
cial shocks which are predominantly transmitted via the supply side have stronger
macroeconomic effects than those transmitted predominantly via the demand side
(see appendix). That is very much in line with the empirical observations made by
34Logically, the fall in consumption is also smaller, 0.05%, as the real rate falls by less.
35See appendix for further analysis of real-financial shocks.
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34Logically, the fall in consumption is also smaller, 0.05%, as the real rate falls by less.
35See appendix for further analysis of real-financial shocks.
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Broadbent and others outlined earlier in the introduction. The aggregate supply is
a powerful propagator of financial shocks in the current model.
4.3 Variance decomposi io
Next, we would like to apprehend the most important shocks for explaining the
variation in the model. To do so, we decompose the volatilities of all variables using
the five shocks discussed above. The percentages are reported in Table II.7.
The first observation is that the financial shock, followed by the monetary policy
and technology shocks explain the vast majority of the model volatility. The asset
price shock and the shock to the utilization costs are, in contrast, almost irrelevant.
Continuing with output, more than half of its volatility is explained by the finan-
cial shock. Approximately a fourth is explained by the monetary policy shock, and
just under a fifth by the technology shock. That is not surprising since the financial
accelerator mechanism plays a significant role in the model construction. What is
more surprising and affiramtive of the importance of the interaction between the
supply-side and finance is that taken together, the TFP and financial shock roughly
explain three-fourths of the variation in the majority of the model variables.36On the
other hand the wedge shock (which propagates via the demand-side) plays a very
minor role. Taking further into account that a monetary policy shock passes through
the demand side (via consumption Euler equation and investment demand) as much
as the supply side (via cost of capital, intertemporal risk smoothing in capital input
market, and more broadly firm marginal production costs), it becomes evident that
the supply side in conjunction witht financial frictions is the most important motor
of the model. Moreover, it suggests that the current model is sufficiently different
from the canonical BGG (1999) or Gerba (2014), in which the demand side coupled
with financial frictions were the most important motor, in order to be considered as
separate.37
36The only exceptions are the real interest rate, the utilization cost function and marginal costs.
For marginal costs, 42% of the variation is explained by the TFP and financial shocks together,
which is far from negligible, and only slightly after the monetary policy shock.
37For a variance decomposition of the BGG (1999) and Gerba (2014) models using the same
calibrations, do not hesitate to contact the authors for details.
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just under a fifth by the technology shock. That is not surprising since the financial
accelerator mechanism plays a significant role in the model construction. What is
more surprising and affiramtive of the importance of the interaction between the
supply-side and finance is that taken together, the TFP and financial shock roughly
explain three-fourths of the variation in the majority of the model variables.36On the
other hand the wedge shock (which propagates via the demand-side) plays a very
minor role. Taking further into account that a monetary policy shock passes through
the demand side (via consumption Euler equation and investment demand) as much
as the supply side (via cost of capital, intertemporal risk smoothing in capital input
market, and more broadly firm marginal production costs), it becomes evident that
the supply side in conjunction witht financial frictions is the most important motor
of the model. Moreover, it suggests that the current model is sufficiently different
from the canonical BGG (1999) or Gerba (2014), in which the demand side coupled
with financial frictions were the most important motor, in order to be considered as
separate.37
36The only exceptions are the real interest rate, the utilization cost function and marginal costs.
For marginal costs, 42% of the variation is explained by the TFP and financial shocks together,
which is far from negligible, and only slightly after the monetary policy shock.
37For a variance decomposition of the BGG (1999) and Gerba (2014) models using the same
calibrations, do not hesitate to contact the authors for details.
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4.4 Statistical moments
The statistical moments are reported in Tables II.4 and II.5. For that, we have
calculated the statistical moments for all variables using the longest data sample
period available from 1953:I - 2014:IV.38Following Stock and Watson (1998), we
choose 1953:I as the starting year of our sample since the (post-war) quarters prior
to 1953 include noise and inaccuracies in the data recording. The sample includes
247 quarters (or 62 years) which is the closest approximation available for the long-
run (cyclical) moments that is generated by the model. During this period, the
US economy experienced 10 cycles (using NBER business cycle dates), and the
average GDP increase (quarter-on-quarter) during expansions was 1.05% while it
was -0.036% during recessions. The data were downloaded from Flow of Funds
at the Fed St Louis database. These were de-trended using a standard two-sided
HP-filter before their moments were calculated.39
4.4.1 Correlations
Let us begin wit the correlations reported in Table II.4. The DSGEmodel is cap ble
of matching quiet a few of the correlations. In particular, it matches relativ ly well
the autocorrelations of output, inflation, and (especially) capital. T e matching
of demand side correlations is also very good. So, the correlation of investment
to output, and consumption to output is almost the same s the value obtained
from the US data (0.98 vs 0.90 and 0.30 vs 0.32). A similar accomplishment is also
achieved for the stock market variables in the model. The corr lation of stock prices
to outp t is 0.97 in the model and 0.83 in the data. Equally, residual earnings to
output h s a c rrelation of 0.61 in the model and 0.76 in the data. Lastly, the book
value to output has a correlation of 0.59 in the model and 0.90 in the data.
N xt, the model manages to capture some of the supply side orrelations. In
particular, the d ta correlations of capital-output, marginal costs-output, apital-
interest rate, capital-marginal costs, and labor-output are closely matched by the
model. Moreover, and confirming the observations in the impulse response analysis,
the correlation between the front payment s are for capital purchases ϑt nd output
is strongly countercyclical (-0.97). Another interesting insight comes from the corre-
lation betwee the share, ϑt and capital (-0.31), or residual earnings (-0.67). These
38The most recent data recorded is for 2014:IV using Fed St Louis database on March 2, 2015.
39This is in order to allow for a smoother comparison with the model generated (cyclical)
moments.
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numbers are in line with the intuition from the model. A higher (lower) pre-payment
share will force entrepreneurs to use a higher (lower) proportion of their liquid funds
to fund their capital purchases. However, since these are limited, the total amount
of capital they can purchase will be lower (higher) compared to the case without
such a constraint. Hence the negative correlation since less (more) capital will be
bought and accumulated in total. Along the same lines, a positive (negative) resid-
ual earnings means that the economic outlook of the future is positive (negative)
since the market value is above (below) the book value. Knowing this, CGP will
have less (more) doubt of entrepreneurs repayment status, and therefore will ask for
a lower (higher) share.40
Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement in the data matching. More
specifically, the correlation of output to inflation is positive and high in the model
(0.83) while it is negative in the data (-0.43).41Equally, the correlation between in-
flation and the interest rate is highly negative in the model (-0.91) while it is positive
in the data (0.34). This implies that the correlation between output and the policy
rate is positive and large (0.78), but since inflation and output have the ’wrong’
sign in the model, the relation between inflation and interest rate is also incorrectly
captured. There are also a few relations where the sign is correct, but where there is
space to improve the magnitudes. Along these lines, the autocorrelation of output,
the autocorrelation of inflation, and the correlation between output and book value
are higher in the data than in the model. To conclude this section, the DSGE model
does a good job in matching a large portion of the US correlations. The supply-side
and demand-side relation are correctly matched, and the autocorrelations are much
closer to the data than in many other financial friction models. However, there is
space for improvement, in particular in capturing the ’true’ relation between output
and inflation, and in bringing the autocorrelations even closer to the data.
4.4.2 Second moments
Let us continue with the (relative) standard deviations reported in Table II.5. Note
that we follow the standard procedure in the literature by calculating the standard
40CGP know that during booms (busts), the probability of default of entrepreneurs will shrink
(rise) and they will receive more (less) external funds in the next period, which assures CGP of
receiving the full payment for their capital sold.
41One reason for why it is negative in the data is because the relation is mainly driven by
supply-side factors, which increase (decrease) output and decrease (increase) inflation in booms,
as noted by Broadbent and others in the introduction.
35
numbers are in line with the intuition from the model. A higher (lower) pre-payment
share will force entrepreneurs to use a higher (lower) proportion of their liquid funds
to fund their capital purchases. However, since these are limited, the total amount
of capital they can purchase will be lower (higher) compared to the case without
such a constraint. Hence the negative correlation since less (more) capital will be
bought and accumulated in total. Along the same lines, a positive (negative) resid-
ual earnings means that the economic outlook of the future is positive (negative)
since the market value is above (below) the book value. Knowing this, CGP will
have less (more) doubt of entrepreneurs repayment status, and therefore will ask for
a lower (higher) share.40
Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement in the data matching. More
specifically, the correlation of output to inflation is positive and high in the model
(0.83) while it is negative in the data (-0.43).41Equally, the correlation between in-
flation and the interest rate is highly negative in the model (-0.91) while it is positive
in the data (0.34). This implies that the correlation between output and the policy
rate is positive and large (0.78), but since inflation and output have the ’wrong’
sign in the model, the relation between inflation and interest rate is also incorrectly
captured. There are also a few relations where the sign is correct, but where there is
spac o improve the magnitudes. Along these lines, the autocorrelation of output,
the autocorrelation of inflation, and the correlation between output and book value
are higher in the data than in the model. To conclude this section, the DSGE model
does a good job in matching a large portion of the US correlations. The supply-side
and demand-side relation are correctly matched, and the autocorrelations are much
closer to the data than in many other financial friction models. However, there is
space for improvement, in particular in capturing the ’true’ relation between output
and inflation, and in bringing the autocorrelations even closer to the data.
4.4.2 Second moments
Let us continue with the (relative) standard deviations reported in Table II.5. Note
that we follow the standard procedure in the literature by calculating the standard
40CGP know that during booms (busts), the probability of default of entrepreneurs will shrink
(rise) and they will receive more (less) external funds in the next period, which assures CGP of
receiving the full payment for their capital sold.
41One reason for why it is negative in the data is because the relation is mainly driven by
supply-side factors, which increase (decrease) output and decrease (increase) inflation in booms,
as noted by Broadbent and others in the ntroduction.
35
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1626
numbers are in line with the intuition from the model. A higher (lower) pre-payment
share will force entrepreneurs to use a higher (lower) proportion of their liquid funds
to fund their capital purchases. However, since these are limited, the total amount
of capital they can purchase will be lower (higher) compared to the case without
such a constraint. Hence the negative correlation since less (more) capital will be
bought and accumulated in total. Along the same lines, a positive (negative) resid-
ual earnings means that the economic outlook of the future is positive (negative)
since the market value is above (below) the book value. Knowing this, CGP will
have less (more) doubt of entrepreneurs repayment status, and therefore will ask for
a lower (higher) share.40
Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement in the data matching. More
specifically, the correlation of output to inflation is positive and high in the model
(0.83) while it is negative in the data (-0.43).41Equally, the correlation between in-
flation and the interest rate is highly negative in the model (-0.91) while it is positive
in the data (0.34). This implies that the correlation between output and the policy
rate is positive and large (0.78), but since inflation and output have the ’wrong’
sign in the model, the relation between inflation and interest rate is also incorrectly
captured. There are also a few relations where the sign is correct, but where there is
space to improve the magnitudes. Along these lines, the autocorrelation of output,
the autocorrelation of inflation, and the correlation between output and book value
are higher in the data than in the model. To conclude this section, the DSGE model
does a good job in matching a large portion of the US correlations. The supply-side
and demand-side relation are correctly matched, and the autocorrelations are much
closer to the data than in many other financial friction models. However, there is
space for improvement, in particular in capturing the ’true’ relation between output
and inflation, and in bringing the autocorrelations even closer to the data.
4.4.2 Second moments
Let us continue with the (relative) standard deviations reported in Table II.5. Note
that we follow the standard procedure in the literature by calculating the standard
40CGP know that during booms (busts), the probability of default of entrepreneurs will shrink
(rise) and they will receive more (less) external funds in the next period, which assures CGP of
receiving the full payment for their capital sold.
41One reason for why it is negative in the data is because the relation is mainly driven by
supply-side factors, which increase (decrease) output and decrease (increase) inflation in booms,
as noted by Broadbent and others in the introduction.
35
deviation of all variables (except output) with respect to the general business cycle,
both in the model and the data. First and foremost, the DSGE model matches
most of the volatilities in the data. With the only exception of capital and residual
earnings, the model attributes the right type of (relative) standard deviation for all
the other variables. In other words, when a variable is less (more) volatile than the
business cycle in the data, it is identical in the model. In addition, for variables
such as inflation, investment, labor, and net worth of firms, the (relative) standard
deviations in the model are very close to the numbers in the data. Taking into
account that we did not explicitly follow the procedure of ex ante moment matching
when calibrating the model, the results are very promissing.
Where the model could do better is in replicating the second moments of capital
and residual earnings. Whereas capital and residual earnings are more volatile than
the business cycle in the data, they are less volatile in the model. This implies
that their responsiveness to shocks over the business cycle is higher in the data.
Also for some variables, such as the stock market price, consumption or the (policy)
interest rate, the standard deviations in the model could be increased in order to
approximate the empirical figures, even if their general business cycle characteristic
is correct. Taken altogether, however, the DSGE model is effective in replicating
most of the data volatilities, even better than for correlations, and without having
to adopt abstract ad hoc modelling tricks, such as including a large list of shocks,
or introducing autoregressive structures on key variables in the model.
5 Quantitative results in the behavioural model
Our analysis of the behavioural model results is also split into three parts. The first
part is an analysis of (model consistent) impulse responses to a set of independent
white noise shocks. The second is an examination of the (model generated) second-,
and higher-order moments to contrast the fit to the US data. The final part consists
of depicting and analyzing the nature of the model variables over the business cycle.
5.1 Forcing variables
The four shocks we will examine are42:
42There are actually five shocks in the model, but one, the aggregate demand shock, is not
relevant in this model nor does it have a structural interpretation, and therefore we omit it in the
general analysis.
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• (Positive) technology (or TFP) shock, zt
yt = ztztK
αL1−α (67)
,where zt is a white noise shock to the technology factor in the Cobb-Douglas
technology function. We explicitly do not wish to model an AR structure
for the TFP shock since we want to understand the endogenous transmis-
sion power of the model structure without recurring to exogenous (or ad hoc)
extensions. See De Grauwe (2011, 2013) for a longer discussion on how au-
toregressive shocks can and should be omitted in macroeconomic models.
• (Negative) shock to firm financing costs, i.e. a relaxation in the cost of external
financing for firms
xt = ρxxt−1 + x (68)
which is introduced in the aggregate demand equation in 40.
• Standard (negative) monetary policy shock ():
rt = rt−1 + γpit + (1− γ)yt +  (69)
,and lastly,
• (Positive) shock to utilization cost, uct, in the utilization cost function:
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 + uct (70)
,where uct has the following AR structure:
uct = ρucuct−1 + uc (71)
and uc is a white noise shock. In our simulations, we calibrate the AR component
ρuc to 0.1 in order to strictly limit the possibility of the shock driving the model
dynamics. However, a simple white noise utilization cost shock is excessively short-
lived, and does not allow us to study the endogenous dynamics in full.43All the white
noise shock parameters (, rk, z and uc) are calibrated to 0.5.
43Before we begin with the analysis, bear in mind that the behavioural model does not neces-
sarely have one steady state that is time invariant for the same calibration (as is standard for the
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5.2 Impulse response analysis
As for the DSGE model we will only discuss the impulse responses to two shocks,
the TFP or technology shock, and the financial shock. For a longer discussion of
other shocks, please refer to the Appendix.
Figure II.11 depicts the (median) impulse responses to a TFP shock. Figure
II.13 does the same for a (negative) shock o firm external financing conditions.
This shock is well representative of the pre-2008 period, where the firm financing
conditions were very lax and they were able to borrow at an unprecedently low cost.
Symmetrically, follow ng the crash on financial markets in 2007-08, the external
financing costs spiked, and the transmission to the real economy, via the supply side
can be inversly interpreted from the current impulse responses.44In particular, we
would like to test whether the current model is capable of capturing the financial-
supply si e interactions that were noted by several empirical studies mentioned in
the introduction.
Note that the numbers on the x-axis indicate number of quarters. All shocks are
introduced in t=100 and we observe the responses over a long period of 60 quarters
(or 15 years). Observe that in these figures we depict the median impulse response
amongst a distribution of impulse responses generated with different intializations
(or realization) of shocks. The full distribution of impulse responses are instead
depicted in Figures II.14 to II.17. For the sake of clarity in the exposition, we
will only concentrate on the median impulse response however, which is a good
representation of the overall (non-Gaussian) distribution.45
5.2.1 Technology shock
Let us start with the first f the supply sid shocks. An improvement in TFP
( r quivalently, increase in productivity) of 0.5% results in an inflation reduction
(1%) and a more than proportional output exp nsion (1.15%). This is a result of
DSGE method). Therefore, following a white noise shock, the model may not necessarely return
to a previous steady state. If not the same steady state, it can either reach a new steady state,
or have a prolonged response to the initial shock. In other words, there is a possibility for the
temporary shock to have permanent effects in the model (via the animal spirits channel). However,
due to the methodological proximity to the DSGE analogue and because it is a standard evaluation
(and comparison) tool in the literature, we will proceed analyzing the impulse responses in the
behavioural model.
44Since the transmission is symmetric for a positive or negative shock.
45Keep in mind, when interpreting the results, that the impulse responses in the DSGE model
are not conditional on the realization of shocks, since no learning occurs, and thus only a ’repre-
sentative’ unconditional IRF is depicted.
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both the increased capacity in the final goods market, but also from an increase
in investment (0.3%) following the heavy fall in interest rate (1.3%) as a response
o the falling inflation. Following his general supply-side expansion, d posits and
loans to firms also increase (1 and 1.3% respectively) since the value of firm net
worth (i.e. collateral) has increased. As a consequence of the lower marginal cost
to investment and higher marginal return on capital, capital accumulation increases
significantly in the next period (0.5%). This results in a general market optimism
(animal spirits rise by 0.1%).
However, as soon as the inflation starts recovering, interest rate react very rapidly
to their increase and start rising (0.35%). Because of this rise in cost of capital,
coupled with the fall in external financing for firms, investment and output expansion
reverts. However, unlike in the DSGE models, the model has eventually reached a
new steady state, where bank loans, deposits and equity are permanently 1.1%, 0.7%
and 0.1% above the previous pre-shock level. 46 Hence a temporary technology shock
in the behavioural model will have long-lasting positive effects on the banking sector
and fin ncial efficiency.47
5.2.2 Fina cial shock
Let us turn to the financial shock. A relaxation i the xternal financing costs for
firms means hat they will be able to increase their borrowing by 0.2%, and thus
their leverage. The same is true for banks, since they reduce their equity by 0.1%
in order to increase their lending to firms. Firms will use this new credit to increase
their investments by 0.2%. Production will also increase, which will push firm net
worth up in the future. This positive outlook produces an optimism on the market,
generating an increase in nimal spirits of 0.6%. This acceleration in activit pushes
output and inflation up by 0.4% and 0.035%. Monetary authority is rapid in re-
sponding to the rise in inflation and raises the policy rate by 0.33%, with the desired
consequence of attenuating the initial expansion to bring output and inflation back
to their pre-shock level after approximately 3 years (or 12 quarters). Note that, in
contrast to the case with supply shocks (see the appendix), the financial market
variables (loans, deposits and bank equity) return to their pre-shock level relatively
46In DSGE models, this is only possible to achieve with permanent or continuously inserted
shocks.
47Arising from the additional dynamics generated by learning.
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swiftly.48We believe the rea on lies in the m del construction. Si e alterations
in the cost of corporate financing are transmitted via demand-side channel in thi
mode , the macroeconomic effects are short-term and there is ther fore no funda-
mental reason for why credit should be upplied at a new level. On the other hand,
when th economy is faced with supply shocks, the m croeconomic impact is more
long-lasting, and he bank can therefore provide more (less) credit at the higher
(lower) productivity level. This endogenous mec anism is very much n line with
what has bee rgued in the empirical macroecon mic litera ure hat fundamental
cha ges in the real economy will be refl cted in perm nent changes in the financial
sector activity.49Furthermore, notice that this mecha ism is very ifficult (if not
impossible) to captur in he current gen ration of DSGE models unless p rm nent
shocks are introduc d.
5.3 istributions a d statistical moments i the behaviou al
model over the bus ness cycle
The second part of the model evaluation consists of analysing and validating the
model-generated distribution and statistical moments over the business cycle. These
are generated using the entire sample period of 2000 quarters. For our purposes, we
will use the data on second and higher moments in Tables II.4 and II.5 to II.6, the
evolution of the model variables over the business cycle in Figures II.18 to II.21, as
well as histograms of a selection of these variables in Figures II.22 to II.24. For the
graphs note that we are plotting the business cycles over a sub-sample period of 100
quarters.
5.3.1 Macroeconomic aggregates
The short-term cycles of output, inflation and the interest rate are asymmetric.
While the amplitude of expansions is in general higher for output, the duration of
recessions is longer. This is further confirmed by the histogram for output, which is
asymmetric and skewed to the right, with a higher probability mass on the left of
the mean of the distribution. Moreover, the autocorrelation of output is very high
48For a monetary policy shock, the financial market variables reach a new level following the
shock, but at a much lower magnitude than any of the supply side shocks.
49For instance, think about the effects from oil shocks on the subsequent deregulation in, and
expansion of the financial sector, or the IT-revolution on the long-term quantity of credit supplied
and the balance sheet management policies adopted by banks.
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quarters.
5.3.1 Macroeconomic aggregates
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While the amplitude of expansions is in general higher for output, the duration of
recessions is longer. This is further confirmed by the histogram for output, which is
asymmetric and skewed to the right, with a higher probability mass on the left of
the mean of the distribution. Moreover, the autocorrelation of output is very high
48For a monetary policy shock, the financial market variables reach a new level following the
shock, but at a much lower magnitude than any of the supply side shocks.
49For instance, think about the effects from oil shocks on the subsequent deregulation in, and
expansion of the financial sector, or the IT-revolution on the long-term quantity of credit supplied
and the balance sheet management policies adopted by banks.
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(0.86), as is the volatility (2.17) and it is leptokurtic (kurtosis=10.91).
The opposite applies to inflation. The amplitude of deflationary periods is in
general higher, while th duration of inflationary p ri ds is longer. Fr m histogram,
the distribution of inflation is slightly skewed to the left. In line with the data,
inflation is three times less volatile than output but has a very similar kurtosis to
output. Further, inflation is very persistent over time (ρ = 0.74) and countercyclical
(-0.42), exactly as in the US data (-0.43).
Turning to the (risk-free) interest rate, it is mostly positive and remains above
the trend for a longer period over the cycle. It is also highly correlated with the
business cycle (0.39) as well as with inflation (0.57), indicating a firm inflation target
on the part of the monetary authority. It is almost as volatile as output (0.95), but
highly skewed to the left (-4.29) compared to the general business cycle.
5.3.2 Firm and supply-side variables
From Figure II.19, capital stock is mostly positive over the cycle, with a mean-
reversion around 1. This is in line with the data on inventories, which shows it
is positive mean-reverting. It is highly persistent (ρ = 0.95) and positively cor-
related with output (0.45). It is also highly correlated with animal spirits (0.34).
Distribution-wise, it is less volatile than the business cycle (0.413), but heavily
skewed to the right (3.48).
The first thing to observe regarding utilization costs is that while apparently
more volatile, it oscillates within a much smaller interval compared to any of the
other variables. Hence, the volatility is 4 times smaller compared to output. In
addition, it reverts around a mean of approx. 0.5. This is in line with the data,
which points towards a largely non-negative cost in utilizing capital over the cycle.
It is however weakly countercyclical (-0.1), and symmetric as well as mesokurtic.
The ’cash-in-advance constraint’ ϑt is strictly non-negative and acyclical (0.02).
It is also independent from the cycles of capital- (-0.01), and financing spread (0.01).
In addition, the distribution of ϑt is highly volatile, skewed to the right and leptokur-
tic. Effectively, with 95% probability (or higher) ϑt is significantly above zero.
On the other hand, the financing spread for firms is highly countercyclical (-0.41),
as well as negatively correlated with animal spirits (-0.12). This is consistent with
the model set-up and data, which show that during expansions both the real risk
(via a higher collateral value) and the perceived risk (via the optimistic sentiment)
of loan default falls, which pushes down the risk premium and so the spread. The
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opposite holds for recessions. That is why the spread is both negatively correlated
with the business cycle (collateral value), and with the market sentiment (agents’
risk perception). Statistically, the spread is as volatile as the general business cycle,
but highly skewed to the left, meaning that for most of the time the spreads will
be close to zero (or negative), This is further confirmed by the graph in Figure
II.20. However, with some non-negligible probability, the spread can spike, causing
a severe contraction in liquidity and the banking market.50These results are also
in line with the (model-generated) s atistical moments on loan supply, which is
procyclical (0.11), positively correlated with animal spirits (0.12) and capital-net
worth (0.28), but negatively correlated with the financing spread (-0.1)
5.3.3 Mark t sentim nt
An important driver of the business cycle is the market sentiment (or animal spirits).
It is highly procyclical (0.84) throughout the entire sample period (see Figure II.26).
Moreover, we observe a higher persistence during the pessimistic interval compared
to the optimistic. This is in line with our previous observation on the general
business cycle (or output) showing that recessions have a longer duration compared
to expansions. Moreover, market sentiment has fat tails on the left and right of the
mean, but is smoother than the general business cycle.
5.4 Moment matching
The next step in model validation consists of matching the (model generated) mo-
ments to the US data. A full list of variables and other details can be found in Table
II.1.
5.4.1 Correlations
The behavioural model matches precisely the correlations of many supply-side and
financial variables. This includes credit to firms, deposits, the (risk-free) interest
rate, inflation, and firm financing spread. It is also very successful in reproducing
the autocorrelations of output, capital, and inflation, as well as the correlations
between capital and credit to firms, and inflation and the (risk-free) interest rate.
50However, the spread is not persistent (ρ = 0.01) implying an RBC type of frictionless financial
sector, and non-staggered price setting. That is not a surprise for the current model since the
financial market is modeled in reduced form. However, future work should try to extend the model
by modeling a more complex and empirically consistent financial price setting mechanism.
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However, there is room for improvement in matching stock variables, such as firm
and bank net worths, some macroeconomic aggregates (investment mainly) as well
as the autocorrelation of firm financing spread. While th y are all acyclical and
not persistent in the model, they are highly procyclical and highly persistent in the
data.
5.4.2 Second and higher moments
Turning to (relative) second-, third-, and fourth moments, the model is highly suc-
cessful in reproducing the moments of inflation, the (risk-free) interest rate, credit
to firms, deposits, and net worth of banks. It is also successful in making net worth
of firms more skewed and more leptokurtic than output. However, the moments of
the latter are higher in the model compared to US data. On the other hand, capital
and investment are smoother in the model.
Another strength of the model lies in reproducing irregular business cycles. In
contrast to standard first-, second-, or even third order approximated DSGE models.
the behavioural model generates substantial asymmetries between expansions and
recessions as well as produces non-Gaussian probability distribution functions for
most variables. That is much more in line with the observed pattern in the US
cyclical data. Nonetheless, for some variables (net worth, consumption, savings,
(risk free) interest rate, and credit to firms) the model generates excessive skewness
and/or kurtosis.
To sum up, the model matches most of the US data. This includes supply-side
and financial variables such as the (risk-free) interest rate, inflation, credit to firms,
deposits, firm financing spread and net worth of banks. It is also successful in
matching several supply relations (capital-firm credit, inflation-interest rate) as well
as their autocorrelations (output, capital and inflation) There is, however, some
scope for improvement in matching demand-side variables (such as consumption,
savings, investment) as well as stocks (net worth of firms).
5.5 The nature of business cycles
Next, we wish to understand to what extent the model is capable of generating
inertias in the business cycles.
As discussed in Milani (2012) and DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), business
cycle movements in a rational expectations environment arise as a result of exoge-
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nous shocks (including the autoregressive structure of shocks), leads and lags in the
endogenous transmission of shocks (such as lagged or expected output), habit for-
mation, interest rate smoothing, or nominal rigidities (price and wage stickiness).
One could therefore call this ’exogenously created’ business cycle fluctuations. The
behavioural model, on the other hand, generates inertia and business cycle fluctua-
tions even in the absence of endogenous frictions, lags in endogenous transmissions,
and autocorrelated shock structures, as shown in DeGrauwe (2012).51In the current
case, however, we have inttroduced supply-side and financial market frictions, as
well as leads and lags in the output, inflation and capital transmissions.52This is
in order to set the behavioural model at par with a standard DSGE model, so to
facilitate the comparison between the two frameworks.
The evolution of the different model variables over the business cycle are reported
in figures II.18 to II.26. The time period covered is 100 quarters, which is enough
to cover multiple cycles.53The first thing to note is that with this ’snapshot’ of the
business cycle, we have managed to capture one long cycle (with a high amplitude)
followed by several shorter cycles. Not only is the business cycle peak the highest
during those 25 years (t = 295), but the amplitude is also the widest (between t =
[280 : 300] counting from trough to trough). Moreover, the subsequent bust is the
sharpest, since it takes the economy more than 40 quarters to return to a level above
the long-run trend (or above the zero line). In addition, the subsequent expansions
are significantly weaker, somewhat implying that some fundamental (or structural)
changes occured in the economy following the preceeding boom and bust.54Compare
that to the boom preceeding the Great Recession and the subsequent bust in the
US.
Closely related to above observations, we find that the other variables experience
similar cycles (inflation, interest rate, capital and the financing spread). Because the
main propagation mechanism is on the supply side, inflation falls when output rises
(and vice versa).55So during the sharpest boom, inflation experienced its sharpest
51DeGrauwe (2012) analyses only 3 variables in his paper: output, inflation and animal spirits.
On the other hand, in the current paper we will analyse and contrast many more variables in order
to get a hollistic view of the business cycle performance of the model.
52Note that capital only has lagged transmission structure, no leads are incorporated. That is
standard in the macroeconomics literature.
53The model is simulated over 2000 quarters, so data and figures for the longer time period are
available upon request.
54However, to confirm this fact one would need to perform a structural breaks analysis on the
full data, which includes the trend.
55See Figure II.18 for the correlation between output and inflation during the entire period.
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decline. However, in contrast to output, inflation oscilliates relatively evenly around
zero (i.e. we don’t observe any temporal shifts in the trend).
As expected, the interest rate responds elastically to the evolution of inflation
(see Figure II.18). Nevertheless, it is smoother than inflation since we have included
n interest rate lag in the Taylor rule (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli, 2014), which
smoothens the reaction of the interest rate to inflation. We also observe a lag in
the response of inflation to monetary policy over the cycle, in line with observations
from the data.
Capital, on the other hand, is positively skewed and is mostly above the zero line
during the entire period. Since it is a stock variable, that is to be expected and in line
with the US data (see table II.6. In addition, capital accumulates the most during
the long expansionary period discussed above, and contracts under the proceeding
episode. Just as the general business cycle, the subsequent capital accumulations
are weaker, and the stock of capital is still below its pre-crisis level 40 quarters (or
10 years) after the bust. Contrast that to the Great Recession episode.
In the same vein, utilization costs are also positively skewed (see Figure II.24),
but more volatile than output. This is to be expected since utilization cost function
is of second order (see equation 4) and depends directly on the production capacity.
Therefore the olatili y of production will be squared, which increases the fluctua-
tions in the cost. Also, as Figure II.19 shows, the more capital is accumulated and
used in production, the higher utilization costs the producer will face (due to the
inherent trade-offs exp ained in subsection 2.1.2). The correlation between the two
is positive throughout the entire period.
Just as in the DeGrauwe (2011,12) and DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) mod-
els, output is highly correlated with animal spirits throughout the entire period.
Its correlation with animal spirits is 0.83 (see figure II.26 and table II.4). We can
interpret the role of animal spirits in the model as follows. When the animal spirits
index clusters in the middle of the distribution we have tranquil periods. There is no
particular optimism or pessimism, and agents use a fundamentalist rule to forecast
the output gap. At irregular intervals, however, the economy is gripped by either
a wave of optimism or of pessimism. The nature of these waves is that beliefs get
correlated. Optimism breeds optimism; pessimism breeds pessimism. This can lead
to situations where everybody has become either optimist or pessimist. The index
then becomes 1 respectively 0. These periods are characterized by extreme positive
or negative movements in the output gap (booms and busts).
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Let us continue by examining one of the novelties of this model, the share of
loan down payment. It is clear from Figure II.20 that when the economy expands
and the stock market booms, the share of loans required by CGP for pre-payment
is very low, and often zero. This is due to the stock market boom implying a low
probability of default for entrepreneurs (since its collateral value is high, or loan-to-
value ratio low). Because of this low probability of default, entrepreneurs will be
able to borrow more, increasing their (expected) cash positions and so CGP will not
require a pre-payment. In contrast during an exceptionally sharp contraction (as in
t = [295, 300]) CGP become wary of entrepreneur’s ability to pay for their capital
purchases in the next period, and therefore require a high share to be pre-paid. The
higher the contraction, the higher the share required to be pre-paid (see lower graph
in Figure II.20). The model is capable of generating these asymmetries over the
cycle.
To conclude, we see a strong co-movement between asset prices on one hand,
and net worth and the financing spread on the other. During stock market booms,
net worth rises which increases firm’s collateral value and reduces its probability of
default, and so it reduces the external financing spread (as it is less risky for banks
to lend to firms).
6 DSGE versus behavioural: Two worlds, one vi-
sions?
Having completed the separate analysis of the two models, we are in position to
compare and discuss the relative performance of the two frameworks. To achieve
that, we will first and foremost compare the statistical matching of the two models
in order to evaluate which model does overall a better job, as well as what features
are more accurately modelled in each of the frameworks. Second, we will compare
the impulse responses and examine where the strongest transmission mechanism ex-
ists. Lastly, we will discuss the importance of capturing business cycle asymmetries
by looking at the empirical regularities in the US data and compare it to the quan-
titative results in the behavioural model. To facilitate such comparisons, we have
kept the endogenous mechanisms and shocks (to the extent possible) the same in
both models. As a rough verifier of this synchronicity, notice in Table II.5 that the
persistence as well as the amplitude of the business cycles are very similar in both
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models (0.85 vs 0.59 and 2.47 vs 3.08).
6.1 Second moment matching: One vision?
Starting with the matching of correlations in Table II.4, both models do a good
job in capturing many (if not most) of the correlations. However, the behavioural
model does even better and matches 13 correlations better than the DSGE, while the
opposite number is 4. In addition the behavioural model manages to exactly match
5 of the correlations and the DSGE model 4. Roughly speaking, the correlations
that the behavioural model is better in capturing are the autocorrelations (output,
capital, inflation), the stock market cycle (stock price-output, animal spirits/residual
earnings-output), prices (inflation-output, real rate-output, inflation-interest rate),
and many of the supply-side relations (loan supply-output, marginal costs-output,
capital-interest rate, capital-loan supply, and labor demand-output). On the other
hand, the DSGE model is better in matching the capital series (capital-output,
capital-marginal costs and the autocorrelation of capital) and some demand-side
variables (investment-output, consumption-output).56
We find a similar pattern for the second moments in Table II.5. Since in both
models the amplitude of the business cycles is very similar, we can be safe in di-
rectly comparing the relative standard deviations. In 8 cases, the behavioural model
matches more precisely the second moments, while the number of cases is 5 for the
DSGE. So the behavioural model has a comparative advantage in prices (inflation,
interest rate, stok market price), and some of the financial accelerator variables (loan
supply, net worth of banks, net worth of firms). The DSGE model, on the other
hand, matches more of the supply side variables (marginal costs, labor demand) as
well as some demand-side ones (investment, consumption, book value). 57To sum
up the empirical fit, both models do a good job in capturing the standard statistical
(second) moments in the US data. While the strength in the behavioural framework
lies in replicating the autocorrelations, the statistical moments of prices (includ-
ing stock prices), some stock variables, and some supply-side relations, the DSGE
has a comparative advantage with respect to capital and the demand-side relations.
Nonetheless, the behavioural framework outperforms the DSGE in the total number
56The only 5 correlations that neither of the models manage to replicate are the savings-output,
loan supply-marginal costs, autocorrelation of marginal costs, net worth of banks-output, and net
worth of firms-output.
57The only 3 standard deviations that neither of the models were capable of matching is capital,
animal spirits/residual earnings, and savings.
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of replicated moments.
6.2 Impulse esponses: One vision?
Continuing with the impulse responses, we generally observe a starker transmis-
sion and higher responses to supply side shocks in the behavioural model but to
financial/monetary shocks in the DSGE model. Let us begin with the TFP shock.
Comparing the two Figures II.11 and II.1, it seems that the TFP shock is, in rela-
tive terms, transmitted more heavily via the demand side onto output in the DSGE
model. This inference is based on the fact that while investment responds by sig-
nificantly more in the DSGE model (3.5% vs 0.3%), inflation rises (while it falls
in the behavioural), the interest rate marginally rises (while it falls heavily in the
behavioural) and output rises by less (1% vs 1.15%). Furthermore, the financial
market variables in the behavioural model converge towards a significantly higher
level compared to the pre-shock state. Remembering moreover that the autore-
gressive parameter in the DSGE model is set to 0.99 while none is included in the
behavioural, it implies that the supply-side transmission is much more powerful in
the behavioural model compared to the DSGE. A similar pattern is observed for a
shock in utilization costs.58For the financial shock, on the other hand, the impulse
responses in the DSGE model are between 5 to 10 times igher. In the DSGE
(behavioural) model, output rises by 2% (0.4%), inflation by 0.2% (0.035%), invest-
ment by 10% (0.2%), residual earnings by 1.8% (0.6%) and capital by 1% (0.1%).
For this shock, no autoregressive parameter has been included in either of the mod-
els. Therefore in this case, the cognitive limitation of agents plays a smaller role in
the propagation of financial shocks, while the supply channel as a financial shock
propagator plays a more important role.59
58In the DSGE model, the responses to the same shock are, on average, 50-100 times lower
compared to the impulse responses in the behavioural model. Remember that in this case, the
shock is modelled without an AR coefficient in the DSGE model, while the AR parameter in the
behavioural is set to a very low value of 0.1
59A similar difference is observed following a monetary policy shock. The impulse responses
in the DSGE model are between 3 and 5 times higher. The exception is investment, where the
response is 20 times higher in the case of the DSGE model, pointing towards a stronger investment
channel of monetary policy in that framework.
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6.3 Business cycle asymmetries: H w import nt?
The last point of comparison is the relative importance of including model asymme-
tries over the business cycl . We have already seen that many of th variables in t
US data do not have the same amplitude during expansions and recessions. How-
ever, the fundamental question is how important these are for the general business
cycle modelling and for understanding the core propagation mechanisms in an econ-
omy? Is a symmetric approach a good approximation? We will attempt to answer
this question under the current framework. Since we make use of a method (linear
approximation) that produces symmetric distributions (DSGE), and at the same
time a highly non-linear that produces asymmetric distributions (behavioural), we
are capable of evaluating the relative fit of linear approximations to data, as well as
try to provide an answer to the question of whether highly non-linear (and complex)
modelling tools are necessary in order to understand the latent underlying structure
of an economy.
If we look at the statistical values of the US business cycle in Table II.6, the
series seems to be weakly skewed (skewness factor=-.042), but highly platykurtic
(kurtosis=0.22). Thus the business cycle is roughly symmetric and has almost no
tails, meaning that the economy has not experienced exceptional expansions or re-
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the behavioural model. Also the distributions of financial variables (such as loan
supply, deposits, interest rate,net worth of firms, net worth of banks) and of prices
(such as infla ion, stock market prices and an mal spirits/residual earnings) are
closely characterized in the model. If anything, the asymmetry or kurtosis of these
variables is, in general, (much) higher in the model than in the data, even if the
general pattern is well captured. In these instances, therefore, it is not appropriate
to apply a linear approximation method since these statistical anomalies would not
at all be captured. Even non-linear perturbation methods recently applied in the
DSGE literature would struggle to accomplish these distributions without including
many frictions and shocks. Therefore which model to use depends very much on
what you are interested in exaiening. If the focus is on the general business cycle
and/or the aggregate demand, then the linearly approximated DSGE model is a
good option since it is tractable and easy to solve without compromising on the
complexity. If, on the other hand, the focus is to understand financial frictions,
the financial cycle, or the impact of supply-financial interactions on business cycle
anomalies, then the behavioural model is the obvious option.
As a final remark on the methodological differentiation, bear in mind that the
asymmetries in the behavioural model are endogenously generated from the learning
mechanism of the agents. The interaction between market frictions and the learning
set-up in the model leads to powerful propagation of shocks. In the DSGE model,
on the other hand, this propagation is achieved via the interaction between market
frictions and highly persistent shocks.62
To sum up the comparative section, both models perform well in matching the
standard stati tical (second) mom n s in the data, as well as generating pow rful
propagation of shocks. Including the stock market and the interaction between ag-
gregate supply, financial accelerator and stock markets improves significantly the
empirical fit of the financial accelerator model, and it rightly reproduces the recent
observations made by Broadbent, Massani and others regarding the most recent
business cycle. In it, not only does the supply side amplify the business cycles, but
it acts as a powerful propagator of financial shocks. Having said that, to addition-
ally relax the rational expectations hypothesis improves even further the empirical
fit, and the asymmetric nature of many macroeconomic and financial variables.
Moreover, the model construction is relatively straight-forward, intuitive, and the
62Except for the shock to financial costs and utilization costs, where no AR parameter is in-
cluded, so the forceful propagation is purely generated from the endogenous model dynamics.
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behaviour of t agents micro-founded. The cost, h wever, is that the supply ide
becomes a weaker propagator of financial (and monetary) shocks, as the impulse
response comparison showed. Lastly, the tractability of the model solution is to
some extent compromised in comparison to the DSGE model.
7 Discussion and c ncluding remarks
Including credit frictions on the supply side is a novel way of thinking about financial
frictions in the macroeconomics literature. Sharp rises in stock prices do not only
allow firms to increase their credit and capital demand, but can equally reduce the
input costs for firms, or their input-output ratio. Conversely, a sharp drop in asset
prices can restrict the supply of credit to firms, increase their production costs,
reduce the supply of capital, and (over time) reduce their production capacity (or
productivity).
In the current paper, we have examined the role that the aggregate supply plays
in propagating shocks generated elsewhere, and quantified the importance of this
channel. In addition, we have performed a (theoretical) comparative analysis of this
mechanism by including the former in a fully rational DSGE framework and contrast
its performance to a bounded rationality behavioural model.
We find that including the above mechanisms in an otherwise standard finan-
cial accelerator model intensifies the transmission of shocks by between 15 and 25
%. Compared to a model where only the stock market mechanism is incorporated,
the impuls responses to fi ancial shock, for instance, are on average 25% lower.
Variance decomposition further affirms the importance of aggregate supply-financial
market interaction since approximately 75% of the model variation can be explained
by the financial and TFP shocks jointly. On a deeper level, the comparative analysis
between the rational expectations DSGE and behavioural models shows that both
perform well in matching the data moments, as well as generating powerful propa-
gation of shocks. The empirical fit is much better compared to competing models
where those mechanisms are excluded. Nontheless, to additionally relax the ratio-
nal expectations hypothesis improves even further the empirical fit to data, and the
asymmetric nature of many macroeconomic and financial variables. The trade-off,
however, is that the supply side becomes (in relative terms to the DSGE model) a
weaker propagator of financial (and monetary) shocks.
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Appendices
I Model derivations in the DSGE model
I.1 The Ohlson (1995) model
The model uses two standard characteristics of the accounting models, and one
behavioral assumption in order to characterize the wedge between market and book
values within the neoclassical framework. Therefore, as Rubinstein (1976) shows,
the value of an asset can be expressed as the present value of expected dividends
(PVED):
Pt = Σ
∞
i=1
Et [dt+i]
(1 + r)i
(I.1)
where Pt is the market value of capital, Dt are dividends, and r is the risk-
free rate. A two-step procedure derives a particularly parsimonious expression for
residual earnings, or goodwill, which collects the difference between the market and
book value of assets. First, the clean surplus relation:
Qt −Qt−1 = et − dt (I.2)
implies the restriction that dividends reduce current book value, but not the
current earnings (but negatively the future), i.e.:
∂Qt
∂dt
= −1 (I.3)
∂et
∂dt
= 0 (I.4)
∂Et [et+1]
∂dt
= −(r − 1) (I.5)
Peasnell (1982) shows that this condition is sufficient to express market valued
in terms of future expected earnings and book value (instead of the sequence of
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Appendices
I Model derivations in the DSGE model
I.1 The Ohlson (1995) model
The model uses two standard characteristics of the accounting models, and one
behavioral assumption in order to characterize the wedge between market and book
values within the neoclassical framework. Therefore, as Rubinstein (1976) shows,
the value of an asset can be expressed as the present value of expected dividends
(PVED):
Pt = Σ
∞
i=1
Et [dt+i]
(1 + r)i
(I.1)
where Pt is the market value of capital, Dt are dividends, and r is the risk-
free rate. A two-step procedure derives a particularly parsimonious expression for
residual earnings, or goodwill, which collects the difference between the market and
book value of assets. First, the clean surplus relation:
Qt −Qt−1 = et − dt (I.2)
implies the restriction that dividends reduce current book value, but not the
current earnings (but negatively the future), i.e.:
∂Qt
∂dt
= −1 (I.3)
∂et
∂dt
= 0 (I.4)
∂Et [et+1]
∂dt
= −(r − 1) (I.5)
Peasnell (1982) shows that this condition is sufficient to express market valued
in terms of future expected earnings and book value (instead of the sequence of
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expected dividends). To do so, let us first define residual earnings as:
ret ≡ et
(r − 1)qt−1 (I.6)
Combined with the clean surplus condition above (expression I.2, we can express
dividends in terms of:
dt = ret −Qt +RQt−1 (I.7)
Iterating the last expression forward for dt+1, dt+2, etc. and re-inserting it into
PVED, we get:
Pt = Qt
∞∑
i=1
Et [ret+i]
ri
(I.8)
provided that Et[yt+i]
ri
→ 1 as i → ∞. Residual earnings is motivated by the
concept that ‘normal earnings’ are return on the capital invested at the beginning
of the period, which are equal to the (replacement) cost of using the capital, i.e.
r∗Qt−1 (book value at time t−1 multiplied by the (risk-free) interest rate).63Hence,
during profitable periods, earnings are above the cost of using the capital, or the
same as saying positive ‘residual earnings’. One can link this idea back to the
Bank of England 2012 report by conceptualizing the profitable periods as periods
of optimism. During periods of high market confidence, the capital is expected to
generate a present value of future earnings above the required earnings demanded by
investors, or the same as saying, positive residual earnings. In other words, the future
profitability of capital, as measured by the present value of future (anticipated)
residual earnings sequence reconciles the difference between the market and the
book value of capital.
Second, to complete the model the time-series behavior of residual earnings need
to be specified. Ohlson (1995) assumes an autoregressive process
ret+1 = αret + vt (I.9)
where α is restricted to be positive, and vt is a scalar variable that represents
information regarding future expected (residual) earnings other than the account-
ing data and dividends. Ohlson (1995) motivates it by the idea that some value-
63The model assumes risk neutrality and homogeneous beliefs, even though Ohlson (1995) has
extended the model to include other risk preferences.
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relevant events may affect future expected earnings as opposed to current earnings
which means that accounting measures incorporate these value-relevant events only
after some time. The scalar information variable is independent of past residual
earnings since the value relevant events have yet to have an impact on the financial
statements. This is the same as saying:
∂vt
∂ret−1
= 0 (I.10)
since it captures all non-accounting information used in the prediction of future
residual earnings. On the other hand, the variable may depend on past realizations
of the same scalar (even if that is not necessary), since they can feed expectations
about future earnings via past beliefs.
Given the assumption of the stochastic process of residual earnings, one can
evaluate Σ∞i=1 ri , and reduce expression I.8 to:
Pt = Qtαretvt (I.11)
Market value can now be reduced to a composite of book value, residual earnings
measuring current profitability and other information that modifies the prediction of
future profitability. Rearranging this expression and using the definition of residual
earnings in I.6, one can also express next period’s expected (total) earnings as:
Et [et+1] = (r − 1)Qtαretvt (I.12)
Note that future earnings only partially depend on the current book value.
Since next period (expected) earnings are formed using information set available
up to period t for all the three components (book value, residual earnings, and
information), the expression poses no problem. However, for earning forecasts two
periods ahead, the model yields no prediction since information from period t+1 is
necessary in order to forecast this variable.
To conclude, though the process [Pt −Qt] allows for serial correlations over suffi-
ciently long periods of time, the average realization approximates zero. This means
that in the very long-run, book value will become the unbiased estimator of market
value.
59
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 64 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1626
relevant events may affect future expected earnings as opposed to current earnings
which means that accounting measures incorporate these value-relevant events only
after some time. The scalar information variable is independent of past residual
earnings since the value relevant events have yet to have an impact on the financial
statements. This is the same as saying:
∂vt
∂ret−1
= 0 (I.10)
since it captures all non-accounting information used in the prediction of future
residual earnings. On the other hand, the variable may depend on past realizations
of the same scalar (even if that is not necessary), since they can feed expectations
about future earnings via past beliefs.
Given the assumption of the stochastic process of residual earnings, one can
evaluate Σ∞i=1 ri , and reduce expression I.8 to:
Pt = Qtαretvt (I.11)
Market value can now be reduced to a composite of book value, residual earnings
measuring current profitability and other information that modifies the prediction of
future profitability. Rearranging this expression and using the definition of residual
earnings in I.6, one can also express next period’s expected (total) earnings as:
Et [et+1] = (r − 1)Qtαretvt (I.12)
Note that future earnings only partially depend on the current book value.
Since next period (expected) earnings are formed using information set available
up to period t for all the three components (book value, residual earnings, and
information), the expression poses no problem. However, for earning forecasts two
periods ahead, the model yields no prediction since information from period t+1 is
necessary in order to forecast this variable.
To conclude, though the process [Pt −Qt] allows for serial correlations over suffi-
ciently long periods of time, the average realization approximates zero. This means
that in the very long-run, book value will become the unbiased estimator of market
value.
59
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 65 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1626
I.2 The financial accelerator model and the optimization
problems
I.2.1 Households
The representative risk-averse household maximizes its lifetime utility, which de-
pends on consumption Ct+k, real money balances M/P t+k and labor hours (fraction
of hours dedicated to work=Ht+k):
max
ct,mt
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk[ln(Ct+k) + ςln
Mt+k
Pt+k
+ θln(1−Ht+k)] (I.13)
constrained by lump-sun taxes he pays in each period Tt, wage income Wt, and
dividends he earns in each period from owning the representative capital good and
retail firms
∏
t, and real savings he deposits in the intermediary,Dt according to the
budget constraint:
Ct = WtHt − Tt +
∏
t
+RtDt −Dt+1 +
[
Mt−1 −Mt
Pt
]
(I.14)
The household takes Wt, Tt, and Rt as given and chooses Ct, Dt+1, Ht and M/P t
to maximize its utility function subject to the budget constraint.
I.2.2 Capital Good Producer
The first key agent in this model is the raw material producer that sells capital to
entrepreneurs (or intermediary good producers). They operate in perfectly compet-
itive markets and are owned by households. Capitla Good producer (CGP) chooses
capital Kt and investment good It to produce capital services K
CGP , which it sells
to entrepreneurs at price Qt. CGP maximizes its profit function
max
Kt,It
E0Σ
∞
t=0Λ0,t[Qt[Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]− It] (I.15)
subject to the investment adjustment cost function:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + [1− κ
2
[
it
it−1
− 1]2]It (I.16)
where [1− κ
2
( it
it−1
− 1)2]It is the adjustment cost function. κ denotes the cost for
adjusting investment.
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I.2.3 Entrepreneur
The other key agent in this model, the representative entrepreneur, chooses capital
Kt, labor input Lt and level of borrowings Bt+1, which he determines at the begin-
ning of each period and before the stock market return has been determined, and
pays it back at the end of each period as stated by Rt+1[QtKt+1 − Nt+1] (where
Rt+1 is the risk-free real rate that borrowers promise lenders to pay back on their
loans, Rkst+1 is the return on market value of assets, Kt+1 is the quantity of capital
purchased at ’t+1’ and Nt+1 is entrepreneurial net wealth/internal funds at ’t+1’)
to maximize his profits according to:
V = maxE0
∞∑
k=0
[(1− µ)
∫ 
0
ωdFωU rkt+1]Et(R
ks
t+1)Stψ(ut)Kt+1 −Rt+1[StKt+1 −Nt+1]
(I.17)
with µ representing the proportion of the realized gross payoff to entrepreneurs’
capital going to monitoring, ω is an idiosyncratic disturbance to entrepreneurs’
return (and  is hence the threshold value of the shock), EtR
ks
t+1 is the expected
stochastic return to stocks, and U rkt+1 is the ratio of the realized returns to stocks
to the expected return (≡ Rkst+1/EtRkst+1). The entrepreneur uses household labor
and purchased capital at the beginning of each period to produce output on the
intermediate market according to the standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = At[ψ(ut)Kt]
αL1−α (I.18)
where Yt is the output produced in period ’t’, At is an exogenous technology pa-
rameter, Kαt is the share of capital used in the production of output, ψ(ut) are the
utilization costs, and L1−αt is the labor share. Utilization costs are defined as:
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (I.19)
The physical capital accumulates according to the law of motion:
Kt+1 = Φ
It
Kt
Kt + (1− δ)Kt (I.20)
with Φ It
Kt
Kt denoting the gross output of new capital goods obtained from invest-
ment It, under the assumption of increasing marginal adjustment costs, which we
capture by the increasing and concave function Φ. δ is the depreciation rate of
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capital.
The entrepreneur borrows funds from the financial intermediary, as a complement
to its internal funds, in order to finance its purchase of new capital, which is described
by the following collateral constraint:
Bt+1 ≤ ψ(st)Nt+1 (I.21)
and the cost of external funding, which is represented by the external finance pre-
mium (EFP) condition:
Et(R
ks
t+1)
Rt+1
= s
[
Nt+1
StKt+1
]
(I.22)
By assuming a fixed survival rate of entrepreneurs in each period, the model
assures that entrepreneurs will always depend on external finances for their capital
purchases, and are further assumed to borrow the maximum amount, subject to the
value of their collateral (which means that the collateral constraint will bind with
equality).
The entrepreneur also faces the cash-in-advance constraint in its purchases of
capital in the input market. More specifically, it must pre-pay a share of its total
capital purchases, which depends on its net borrowing position according to:
Et[St+1]Kt+1 ≤ ϑtBt = ϑt[Et[St+1]Kt+1 −Nt] (I.23)
To complete the model, let us look at the maximization problem of the remaining
agents in the model: financial intermediaries, retailers and government.
I.2.4 Financial intermediary
The role of the financial intermediary in this model is to collect the deposits of
savers, and to lend these funds out to borrowers through 1-period lending contracts
against a risk-free return Rt that households demand on their deposits. Because
of information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, the intermediary needs
to invest some costly monitoring of the borrowers in order to assure that borrowers
survive to the next period and pay back the return on deposits. Therefore the wedge
between the rate they charge entrepreneurs for their borrowings, Rkst , and the one
that they pay out to households for their deposits Rt reflects this monitoring cost.
Most importantly, the intermediary can not lend out more than the deposits they
have (incentive constraint), and it operates in a perfectly competitive market. This
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means that in each period, intermediaries choose a level of borrowings Bt in order
to maximize:
max
Bt
F = Et
∞∑
t=0
(Rkst−1Bt −Bt+1)− (Rt−1Dt −Dt+1)− µ(ωRt+1QtKt+1) = pit (I.24)
where µωRt+1QtKt+1 is the monitoring cost of borrowers. The amount of lending is
constrained by the incentive constraint:
Bt+1 ≤ Dt+1 (I.25)
and the intermediary makes zero profits in each period:
∞∏
t=0
pit = 0 (I.26)
I.2.5 Retailer
To incorporate the nominal rigidities, a standard feature of New-Keynesian models,
we incorporate a retail sector into this model. Let us look at retailers’ problem.
They set their price of the final good according to the standard Calvo process (1983),
where P ∗t is the price set by retailers who are able to change prices in period ’t’, and
let Y ∗t (z) denote the demand given this price. Then, retailer ’z’ chooses P
∗
t in order
to maximize:
max
Pt(j)
ΩR = E0
∞∑
k=0
θkΛt,k[Pt(j)yt(j)−P ∗t yt(j)−
κp
2
[
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− pilpt−1pi1−lp ]2Ptyt] (I.27)
with θk being the probability that a retailer does not change his price in a given
period, Λt,k ≡ βCt/Ct+1 denoting the household intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution (since households are the shareholders of the retail firms), which they
take as given, and P ωt ≡ Pt/Xt denoting the nominal price of goods produced by a
retailer (Xt is the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods). They face a
demand curve equal to:
yt(j) = [
Pt(j)
Pt
]−
y
t yt (I.28)
where Pt(z)/Pt
− is the nominal price ratio of wholesale goods for retailer ’z’, 
 > 1
is a parameter on retail goods, Y ft is the total final output in the economy which
is composed by a continuum of individual retail goods, and Pt is the composite
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nominal price index of a continuum of individual prices set by retailers.
I.2.6 Government
Finally, a government plans spending, and finances it by either lump-sum taxes, or
money creation (Central Bank division). In each period, it chooses spending Gt, and
a combination of taxes Tt and money creation Mt so to fulfil the balanced budget
condition:
Gt =
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
+ Tt (I.29)
It chooses money creation for budget financing according to a standard Taylor rule:
(1 +Rnt ) = (1 +R
n
t−1)
ρ +
[
Et[pit+1]
pi
]ξ
(I.30)
where Rnt is the policy rate in period ’t’, ρ is the coefficient of interest rate growth,
and ξ is the coefficient on expected inflation in the Taylor rule.
I.3 Solutions
Solving the households optimization problem yields standard first order conditions
for consumption,
1
Ct
= Et
(
β
1
Ct+1
)
Rt+1 (I.31)
labor supply,
Wt
1
Ct
= θ
1
1−Ht (I.32)
and real money holdings,
Mt
Pt
= ςCt
[
Rnt+1 − 1
Rnt+1
]−1
(I.33)
The last equation implies that real money balances are positively related to
consumption, and negatively related to the nominal/policy interest rate.
In the input market, the solution to CGP’s problem is:
Qkt − βEt[
λt+1
λt
(1− δ)Qkt+1] = λcgpt − βEt[
λt+1
λt
(1− δ)Qcgpt+1] (I.34)
and
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(1 +Rnt ) = (1 +R
n
t−1)
ρ +
[
Et[pit+1]
pi
]ξ
(I.30)
where Rnt is the policy rate in period ’t’, ρ is the coefficient of interest rate growth,
and ξ is the coefficient on expected inflation in the Taylor rule.
I.3 Solutions
Solving the households optimization problem yields standard first order conditions
for consumption,
1
Ct
= Et
(
β
1
Ct+1
)
Rt+1 (I.31)
labor supply,
Wt
1
Ct
= θ
1
1−Ht (I.32)
and real money holdings,
Mt
Pt
= ςCt
[
Rnt+1 − 1
Rnt+1
]−1
(I.33)
The last equation implies that real money balances are positively related to
consumption, and negatively related to the nominal/policy interest rate.
In the input market, the solution to CGP’s problem is:
Qkt − βEt[
λt+1
λt
(1− δ)Qkt+1] = λcgpt − βEt[
λt+1
λt
(1− δ)Qcgpt+1] (I.34)
and
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Qkt = λ
cgp
t ⇒ Et[Qkt+1] = Et[λcgpt+1] (I.35)
Turning to the entrepreneur, his choice of labor demand, capital, and utilization
costs yields the following optimization conditions:
(1− α)yt
lt
= xtwt (I.36)
λtq
k
t = Et[St+1]Kt−Nt+1+λt+1Et[αat+1[ktut+1]α−1l1−αt+1 ]ut+1+(1− δ)qkt+1−ψ(ut+1)]
(I.37)
αat[kt−1ut]α−1l1−αt kt−1 − [ξ1 + ξ2(ut − 1)]kt−1 = 0⇒
ξ1 + ξ2(ut − 1) = αat[kt−1ut]α−1l1−αt ≡ rkt (I.38)
As is common in the literature, marginal product of labor equals their wage.
Labor input in the production of wholesale goods can either come from household
or entrepreneurs own labor supply (i.e. they can devote a small fraction of their
own time to the production activity). Therefore entrepreneurs receive income from
supplying labor based on the wage rate above. Since that income stream is assumed
to be marginal in this model however, we can assume that the proportion of en-
trepreneurial labor used for production of wholesale goods is so low that it can be
ignored, so that all of labor supply is provided by the household sector.
Continuing our analysis with the retailers, and differentiating their objective
functions with respect to P ∗t gives us the following optimal price rule:
1− yt +
yt
xt
−κP (pit−pilpt−1pi1−lp)pit+βt+1p Et[
λkt+1
λkt
κP (pit+1−pilpt−1pi1−lp)(pit+1)2
yt+1
yt
] = 0
(I.39)
We can aggregate across retailers, and express their profits (with Calvo pricing)
as:
jRt = yt[1−
1
xt
− κP
2
(pit − pilpt−1pi1−lp)2] (I.40)
To conclude the optimizations, we turn to the representative intermediary. He
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will set the maximum level of lending such that the incentive constraint is satisfied,
and subject to the competitive market condition. Differentiating his value function
with respect to Bt+1 will mean that the level of credit given to the entrepreneurial
sector will be:
Bt+1 = Dt+1 (I.41)
This condition will hold in each period, which means that the intermediary’s balance
sheet expansion is limited to its deposit holdings in each period.
I.4 General equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by a set of prices and quantities, such
that:
Given Wt, Rt, ξ, θ,Dt the household optimizes Ct, Ht, Dt+1
Given Kt, It the capital good producer optimizes K
CGP
t
Given Wt, Rt, R
ks
t , γ, δ, zt, µ,Nt, Kt, ψ(ut) the entrepreneur optimizes
It, Ht, Kt+1, Bt+1, Nt+1, Yt
Given Rt, R
ks
t , Dt+1, Bt the financial intermediary optimizes Bt+1
Given Λt,k, θ, Yt(z), P
ω
t the retailer ’z’ optimizes P
∗
t
Labor, capital and financial markets clear: Hst = H
d
t , K
s
t = K
d
t , Dt = Bt
In the final goods market, the production is governed by the following resource
constraint: yt = ct + q
k
t [kt − (1 − δ)kt−1] + kt−1ψ(ut) + Adjt with Adjt =
κP
2
(pit − pilpt−1p¯i1−lpt )2yt
and
Aggregate demand holds: Yt = Ct + It + C
e
t +Gt
The complete log-linearized model is presented below by the Equations I.42
through I.61. In all the equations, lower case letters denote percentage deviations
from steady state, and capital letters denote steady state values:
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I.5 Log-linearized model
Aggregate Demand:
Resource constraintsource constraint
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it +
Ce
Y
cet (I.42)
Consumption Euler equation
ct = −rt + Et(ct+1) (I.43)
Entrepreneurial consumption
cet = nt (I.44)
Financial accelerator
rkt+1 − rt = −ν(nt − (qt + kt)) (I.45)
External Finance Premium
efpt = r
k
t − rt (I.46)
Return on capital
rkt = (1− )(yt − kt − xt) + st − st−1 (I.47)
Investment accelerator
st = ψ(it − kt) (I.48)
(Stock) Market value of capital
st = qt + ret (I.49)
Residual earnings and formation of stock market expectations
ret = ρreret−1 + (χ)(Et[yt+1] + nt − Et[rt+1]) + ei (I.50)
Aggregate Supply:
Cobb-Douglas production function
yt = a+ αkt + αψ(ut) + (1− α)ωht (I.51)
67
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 73 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1626
Capital (service) production
it =
1
1 + β
it−1 +
β
1 + β
Et[it+1] +
1
κ(1 + β)
qt (I.52)
Utilization costs
ψ(ut) = ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2(ut − 1) (I.53)
Cash-in-advance constraint
1 + nt − (Et[st+1] + kt+1) = ϑt (I.54)
Marginal cost function
yt − ht − xt − ct = 1
η
ht (I.55)
Approximated Philips curve
pit = κ(−xt) + βpit+1 (I.56)
Evolution of State Variables:
Capital accumulation
kt = δit + (1− δψ(ut))kt−1 (I.57)
Net worth accumulation
nt = γR
K
N
(rkt − rt) + rt−1 + nt−1 (I.58)
Monetary Policy Rule and Shock Processes
Monetary policy
rnt = ρr
n
t−1 + ζEt[pit+1] (I.59)
Technology shock
at = ρaat−1 + ea (I.60)
Real interest rate (Fisher relation)
rnt = rt − Et(pit+1)− ern (I.61)
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I.6 Residual earnings
Let us characterize the process governing residual earnings. Our main purpose is
to establish a bridge between the residual earnings and the general state of the
economy. We assume that Xre follows an AR (1) process and make it in addition
contingent on economic fundamentals in the next period, Ft+1|It+1 according to:
Xret+1 = ρx(X
re
t ) + Ft+1|It+1 (I.62)
where ρ is restricted to be positive. Following a vast number of empirical studies
(outlined in section 2.3) who find a strong link between stock prices and economic
fundamentals, this definition gives an important role to the evolution of the economy
in determining residual earnings. Since residuals earnings are related to a firm’s
growth perspectives and their future earnings, the economic fundamentals that are
relevant in this case are entrepreneurial output or industrial production Yt+1 (from
I.18 in the firm’s optimization problem), firm equity Nt+1 (from I.17 and I.21 in the
firm’s optimization), and the nominal interest rate, Rt+1 (from the minimization
of the borrowing cost in I.22). Thus, we have given the monetary authority an
additional channel through which it can influence the stock markets, by altering
the prospects for residual earnings of firms. The full residual earnings process can
therefore be expressed as (in log-linearized format):
ret+1 = ρreret + (χ)Et[Yt+1 +Nt −Rt+1] (I.63)
The parameters ρre and χ determine the importance of each factor (the autore-
gressive process and the (expected) economic fundamentals in the next period) in
determining the value of residual earnings.
II Tables and Figures
II.1 Tables
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Table II.1: Parameters and descriptions
Parameter Description Value
Calibrated Calibration
C/Y Share of consumption in resource constraint 0.806
I/Y Share of investment in resource constraint 0.184
Ce/Y Share of entrepreneurial consumption in resource constraint 0.01
 Marginal product in investment demand 0.99
X Gross markup over wholesale goods 1.10
α Share of capital in production 0.20
Ω Share of household labour in production 0.99
η Labour supply elasticity 5.00
κ Share of marginal cost in Phillips Curve 0.086
θ Calvo pricing 0.75
β Quarterly discount factor 0.99
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
γ Survival rate of entrepreneurs 0.973
R Steady state quarterly riskless rate 1.010
K/N Steady state leverage 2.082
ν Elast. of EFP to leverage 0.092
φ Elast of inv. demand to asset prices 0.25
ρre AR parameter on residual earnings 0.67
χ Parameter on the expected state of the economy in the residual earnings equation 0.18
Ψ Adjustment cost function in investment 0.5
κ Adjustment cost in investment parameter 11
z Technological development parameter 0.5
ξ Parameter 1 in the utilization cost function 0.8
ξ1 Parameter 2 in the utilization cost function 0.3
ξ2 Parameter 3 in the utilization cost function 0.25
εa Std. deviation of technology shock 0.5
εrn Std. deviation of nom. interest rate shock 0.5
εrk Std. deviation of financial shock 0.5
εuc Std. deviation of shock in the utilization cost function 0.5
ρ AR parameter in monetary policy rule 0.95
ζf MP response to expected inflation 0.20
ρa AR parameter of productivity shock 0.99
ρrk AR parameter in financial shock 0
ρuc AR parameter in shock to utilization costs 0
Notes: The calibrated values are standard in the literature. Following Caglar (2012), the new AR parameter in
the extended model, ρre is calibrated to 0.67, in line with the corporate finance literature. Elasticity of external
finance premium to leverage, we calibrate to 0.13.
Table II.2: Model variables and descriptions
Variable Definition
y Output
c Household consumption
ce Entrepreneurial consumption
i Investment
g Government spending
rn Nominal interest rate
r Real interest rate (also the (net) deposit rate of households)
rk Rate of return on capital
q Book value of capital
s Market value of capital
re Residual/Abnormal earnings
efp External finance premium
k Capital stock
n Entrepreneurial net worth
x Mark-up of final good producers
h Hours of labour input in production
pi Inflation
u Utilization rate
ϑ Cash-in-advance to CGP
a Technological progress
ei Information shock
eu Shock to the utilization rate
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Table II.3: Parameters of the behavioural model and descriptions
Parameter Description Value
Calibrated Calibration
pi∗ The central bank’s inflation target 0
d1 Marginal propensity of consumption out of income 0.5
e1 Coefficient on expected output in investment eq. 0.1
d2 Coefficient on expected output in consumption eq. to match a1 = 0.5 0.5 ∗ (1− d1)− e2
d3 Coefficient on real rate in consumption eq. −0.01
e2 Coefficient on real rate in investment eq. to match a2 = −0.5 (−0.5) ∗ (1− d1)− d3
a1 Coefficient of expected output in output eq. (e1 + d2)/(1− d1)
a
′
1 Coefficient of lagged output in output eq. d2/(1− d1)
a2 Interest rate elasticity of output demand (d3 + e2)/(1− d1)
a3 Coefficient on spread term in output eq. −d3/(1− d1)
b1 Coefficient of expected inflation in inflation eq. 0.5
b2 Coefficient of output in inflation eq. 0.05
c1 Coefficient of inflation in Taylor rule eq. 1.5
ψ Parameter of firm equity −0.02
τ Firms’ leverage 1.43
κ Banks’ inverse leverage ratio 0.09
e Equity premium 0.05
αd Fraction of nominal GDP forecast in expected future dividends 0.2
n¯ Number of shares in banks’ balance sheets 40
n˜ Initial value for number of firms’ shares 60
β Bubble convergence parameter 0.98
c2 Coefficient of output in Taylor equation 0.5
c3 Interest smoothing parameter in Taylor equation 0.5
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.025
α Share of capital in production 0.3
Ψ Adjustment cost function in investment 0.5
κ Adjustment cost in investment parameter 11
γ Switching parameter in Brock-Hommes (or intensity of choice parameter) 1
ρ Speed of declining weights in memory (mean square errors) 0.5
z Technological development parameter 0.5
ξ Parameter 1 in the utilization cost function 0.8
ξ1 Parameter 2 in the utilization cost function 0.3
ξ2 Parameter 3 in the utilization cost function 0.25
 Std. deviation of technology shock 0.5
z Std. deviation of nom. Interest rate shock 0.5
x Std. deviation of financial shock 0.5
uc Std. deviation of shock in the utilization cost function 0.5
ρk AR process of shock to utilization cost function 0.1
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Table II.4: Model correlations - comparisons
Correlations Value - behavioural model Value - DSGE model Value - US data
ρ(yt, yt−1) 0.85 0.59 0.85
ρ(yt, kt) 0.67 0.26 0.15
ρ(yt, pit) -0.46 0.83 -0.43
ρ(yt, St) 0.80 0.97 0.83
ρ(yt, ast) 0.80 0.61 0.76
ρ(yt, ADt) 0.15 - -
ρ(yt, ASt) -0.12 - -
ρ(yt, ψ(ut)) -0.1 −1 ∗ 10−3 -
ρ(yt, dt) 0.38 - 0.32
ρ(yt, l
s
t ) 0.25 - 0.18
ρ(yt, rt) 0.37 0.78 0.45
ρ(yt, it) 0.24 0.98 0.90
ρ(yt, ct) 0.21 0.30 0.32
ρ(yt, st) 0.28 0.46 -0.28
ρ(yt, xt) -0.39 -0.84 -0.49
ρ(yt, ϑt) -0.02 -0.97 -
ρ(kt, kt−1) 0.94 0.95 0.88
ρ(kt, ast) 0.51 0.81 -
ρ(kt, ϑt) 2 ∗ 10−3 -0.31 -
ρ(kt, r
n
t ) 0.15 0.49 0.31
ρ(lst , kt) 0.27 - 0.38
ρ(lst , xt) -0.1 - 0.26
ρ(pit, pit−1) 0.79 0.41 0.93
ρ(pit, ast) -0.44 0.13 -
ρ(pit, r
n
t ) 0.56 -0.91 0.34
ρ(pit, r
n
t−1) 0.51 - 0.34
ρ(xt, xt−1) -0.01 -0.1 0.68
ρ(xt, ast) -0.12 -0.23 -
ρ(xt, kt) -0.27 0.07 0.09
ρ(xt, ϑt) 0.01 0.8 -
ρ(ϑt, ast) 0.07 -0.67 -
ρ(yt, n
b
t) 0.03 - 0.45
ρ(yt, n
f
t ) 0.02 0.97 0.22
ρ(yt, ht) 0.84 0.97 0.88
ρ(yt, qt) - 0.59 0.90
Note: GDP deflator was used as the inflation indicator, 3-month T-bill for the risk-free
interest rate, the deposit rate as the savings indicator and the Corporate lending risk spread
(Moody’s 30-year BAA-AAA corporate bond rate) as the counterpart for the firm borrowing
spread in the models. The variables that are left blank do not have a direct counterpart
in the data sample. These are also called ’deep variables’. The only way is to estimate a
structural model (using for instance Bayesian techniques) and to derive a value based on a
(theoretical) structure. Alternatively, one could also approximate values using micro data.
However, this is outside the scope of this paper.
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Table II.5: Second moments - comparison
Variable Behavioural model DSGE model US data
yt 2.47 3.08 0.016
pit 0.33 0.27 0.50
kt 0.38 0.39 1.50
xt 1.07 0.50 0.18
ast 0.13 0.98 5.68
dt 1.60 - 1.36
lst 2.61 - 3.55
rnt 0.91 0.02 0.76
it 0.26 5.03 3.08
ψ(ut) 0.21 0.16 -
ADt 0.2 - -
ASt 0.21 - -
ϑt 79.4 4.38 -
ct 0.25 0.27 0.81
st 0.25 - 8
nbt 4.77 - 1.32
nft 79.4 3.16 2.21
St 1.33 1.23 10.33
qt - 1.02 2.01
ht 1.15 1.18
Note: The moments are calculated taking output as the de-
nominator. Following a standard approach in the DSGE liter-
ature, this is in order to examine the moments with respect to
the general business cycle.
Table II.6: Higher moments - Behavioural vs data
Variable Skewness behavioural Skewness data Kurtosis behavioural Kurtosis data
yt -1.66 -0.42 15.94 0.22
pit -0.009 -0.66 0.25 3.54
kt 0.31 0.82 0.36 -1.66
xt -9.24 -5.8 20.52 58.6
ast 0.02 1.53 0.12 27.15
dt -0.05 1.36 0.18 4.54
lst 0.16 -0.61 0.13 3.57
rnt 1.27 -1.27 1.1 2.38
it 4.63 1.18 8.68 0.71
ψ(ut) -0.001 - 0.03 -
ADt -0.03 - 0.19 -
ASt 0.01 - 0.19 -
ϑt 15.83 - 48.38 -
ct -4.61 0.37 8.78 0.14
st 4.61 0.49 8.8 8.39
nbt -15.78 -2.34 48.19 9.39
nft -15.83 -0.34 48.37 16.37
St -15.84 1.57 48.43 5.18
Note: The moments are calculated taking output as the denominator. In the US data, moments
are calculated taking real GDP as the denominator. These are calculated using the full sample
of US data stretching from 1953:I - 2014:IV. During this period, the US economy experienced
10 cycles (using NBER business cycle dates), and the average GDP increase per quarter during
expansions was 1.05% while it was -0.036% during recessions. The data were de-trended using a
standard two-sided HP filter before the moments were calculated in order to facilitate comparison
with the model generated (cyclical) moments. The variables that are left blank do not have a
direct counterpart in the data sample. These are also called ’deep variables’. The only way is to
estimate a structural model (using for instance Bayesian techniques) and to derive a value based
on a (theoretical) structure. Alternatively, one could also approximate values using micro data.
However, this is outside the scope of this paper. 73
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Table II.5: Second moments - comparison
Variable Behavioural model DSGE model US data
yt 2.47 3.08 0.016
pit 0.33 0.27 0.50
kt 0.38 0.39 1.50
xt 1.07 0.50 0.18
ast 0.13 0.98 5.68
dt 1.60 - 1.36
lst 2.61 - 3.55
rnt 0.91 0.02 0.76
it 0.26 5.03 3.08
ψ(ut) 0.21 0.16 -
ADt 0.2 - -
ASt 0.21 - -
ϑt 79.4 4.38 -
ct 0.25 0.27 0.81
st 0.25 - 8
nbt 4.77 - 1.32
nft 79.4 3.16 2.21
St 1.33 1.23 10.33
qt - 1.02 2.01
ht 1.15 1.18
Note: The moments are calculated taking output as the de-
nominator. Following a standard approach in the DSGE liter-
ature, this is in order to examine the moments with respect to
the general business cycle.
Table II.6: Higher moments - Behavioural vs data
Variable Skewness behavioural Skewness data Kurtosis behavioural Kurtosis data
yt -1.66 -0.42 15.94 0.22
pit -0.009 -0.66 0.25 3.54
kt 0.31 0.82 0.36 -1.66
xt -9.24 -5.8 20.52 58.6
ast 0.02 1.53 0.12 27.15
dt -0.05 1.36 0.18 4.54
lst 0.16 -0.61 0.13 3.57
rnt 1.27 -1.27 1.1 2.38
it 4.63 1.18 8.68 0.71
ψ(ut) -0.001 - 0.03 -
ADt -0.03 - 0.19 -
ASt 0.01 - 0.19 -
ϑt 15.83 - 48.38 -
ct -4.61 0.37 8.78 0.14
st 4.61 0.49 8.8 8.39
nbt -15.78 -2.34 48.19 9.39
nft -15.83 -0.34 48.37 16.37
St -15.84 1.57 48.43 5.18
Note: The moments are calculated taking output as the denominator. In the US data, moments
are calculated taking real GDP as the denominator. These are calculated using the full sample
of US data stretching from 1953:I - 2014:IV. During this period, the US economy experienced
10 cycles (using NBER business cycle dates), and the average GDP increase per quarter during
expansions was 1.05% while it was -0.036% during recessions. The data were de-trended using a
standard two-sided HP filter before the moments were calculated in order to facilitate comparison
with the model generated (cyclical) moments. The variables that are left blank do not have a
direct counterpart in the data sample. These are also called ’deep variables’. The only way is to
estimate a structural model (using for instance Bayesian techniques) and to derive a value based
on a (theoretical) structure. Alternatively, one could also approximate values using micro data.
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Table II.7: Variance decomposition - DSGE model (in percent)
Variable Shock to firm financing costs Monetary Policy shock Technology shock Asset price shock Utilization cost shock
yt 56.85 26.12 16.68 0.35 0
ct 10.65 38.09 51.23 0.03 0
it 70.08 21.72 0.40 0 0
nft 69.85 24.35 5.51 0.28 0
rkt 75.8 17.98 5.83 0.39 0
rt 3.85 95.91 0.22 0.01 0
rnt 73.43 21.67 4.72 0.19 0
kt 70.29 21.26 8.17 0.28 0
ψ(ut) 0 0 0 0 100
qt 69.01 20.36 7.81 2.82 0
xt 39.76 56.73 2.33 0.31 0.88
ϑt 70.15 23.35 6.23 0.27 0
ht 64.46 30.17 4.86 0.40 0.12
pit 57.74 38.72 3.25 0.25 0.24
st 70.08 21.73 7.80 0.40 0
ret 65.65 20.82 7.83 5.70 0
Note: The moments are calculated taking output as the denominator. Following a standard approach in the DSGE literature, this is in order
to examine the moments with respect to the general business cycle.
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Table II.8: US variables and sources
Variable US data name Frequency Source Period
yt Real GDP Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
ct Real Personal Consumption Expenditure Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
it Real Investment Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
kt Capital Stock Annually Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2011:I
ht Hours of All Persons: Nonfarm Business Sector Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2011:IV
dt Total Savings and Time Deposits of Households Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
st Net Private Savings Households Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
lst Credit Market Instruments for Firms Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
rt Effective Federal Funds Rate Monthly Fed St Louis database 1954:II-2014:IV
xt/efpt Moody’s (30 year) BAA - AAA Corporate Bond Spread Monthly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
nbt Financial Business Total Liabilities: Net Worth Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
nft Nonfinancial Corporate Business Net Worth Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
pit GDP Deflator Quarterly Fed St Louis database 1953:I-2014:IV
Note: All variables were downloaded on March 2, 2015. The latest recorded observation for each variable was 2014:IV (except for
capital stock).
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II.2 Impulse response analysis in the DSGE model - remain-
ing shocks
II.2.1 Monetary policy shock
Figure II.3 reports the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
A 0.5% rise in the interest rate increases the cost of financing for firms as well as
the investment rate. As a result, firms will be able to borrow less, which pushes
down their available liquidity, and so investment falls by 6%. Hence capital de-
accumulates by 0.6% and its return falls by 1.5%. On the production end, input
costs become more expensive since the cost of purchasing and financing them are
higher. Marginal costs rise by 1.25%, and labor falls by 1.8%. This slowdown in
production and investment results in a contraction in the firm balance sheet, whereby
net worth contracts by 4%, the (stock) market value of the firm by 1.5%, and the
book value by 1%. Observing this contraction in firm activity, CGP turn more
averse and demand the entrepreneurs to pay a 6% higher share for their capital
purchases, which is signioficant.64Accordingly, inflation falls by almost 0.2% and
output by 1.5%, which forces the monetary authority to decrease the policy rate by
0.018%. However, this fall is smaller than the fall in inflation, which results in a rise
of the real rate.65
Once we remove the interaction term and the stock market, as in BGG (1999), the
responses become around 50-60% weaker. Thus, the rise in marginal cost is 0.75%,
the fall in labor 1%, and the fall in investment only 2.5%. The de-accumulation of
capital is merely 0.2%, which means that capital return is in relative terms higher
to the full model (or -0.7%, and it rapidely rises to 0.5% in quarter 2). The net
worth falls by 1.5% and the (book) value by 0.5%. Correspondingly, inflation falls
by a mere 0.07%, and output by 0.75%.
Even when we include one of the mechanisms, the stock market, the responses
are approximately 20% weaker. Investment falls by 5%, labor by 1.5% and marginal
costs rise by 0.9%. The balance sheet contraction is therefore also weaker, where net
worth contracts by 3.5%, the market value of the firm by 1.2%, and the book value
by 0.6%. As a result, output contracts 20% less than in the full model (1.25%),
64Since in the steady state the share is equal to 0, this means that when faced with a small
monetary policy shock, CGP ask entrepreneurs to pre-pay a 6% share of their total capital input
purchases. This shows that CGP are highly sensitive to firm (and general economic) conditions,
and therefore behave highly elastically over the cycle.
65On the household end, savings rise since the real interest rate goes up, which means that
current consumption is sacrifised for future.
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while inflation contracts 17% less (0.125%).
II.2.2 Utilization cost shock
A rise in the u ilization cost f capital impli s that it is now more costly to use the
capital in production. Thus we should expect a deacceleration in the production,
inflation, and ultimately in output. That is exactly what we observe. A 0.5%
increase in the utilization costs (with no AR parameter in the shock), increases the
marginal costs of the firm by 0.15% and reduces the labor demand by 0.12%. Less
capital is employed in the production and so the labor required in the production
falls. Less production and sales means that (future) net worth will fall, which will
reduce the borrowing capacity of the firm, and therefore investment. Therefore we
observe a fall of 0.003% in net worth, of 0.0015% in residual earnings and of 0.004%
in investment. CGP knowing all this turn more doubtious of the repayment status
of entrepreneurs and therefore ask for a higher pre-payment share for their capital
sold (0.007%). Taking into account the harsher financial condition of firms, the
higher marginal costs they face and the higher pre-payment required for their input
purchases, capital purchases contract by 0.004% as well as its return by 0.001%.
Note, however, that despite the fall in investment, the contraction on the supply-
side (marginal costs, labor demand, pre-payment share) is much heavier than on
the demand-side. Therefore the fall in inflation is mainly driven by the suppl,y-side
contraction since the drop in inflation (-0.012%) is significantly larger than the drop
in investment or consumption together (-0.0046%). Lastly, output drops by 0.001%.
We are not able to make a comparison of this shock transmission to previous
models since utilization costs are a novel feature to this version. One could possibly
try to compare the transmission mechanism here to Christiano and Eichenbaum
(2005) or Gerali et al (2010), but since the model constructions differ considerably
between them, the comparison would be highly inaccurate and possibly counterpro-
ductive.
II.2.3 Asset price wedge shock
In addition to the standard shocks in the literature, we wish to explore the dynamics
of the model in relation to updating of beliefs.66We consider a positive (0.5 %) shock
to residual earnings, and the responses are reported in Figure II.6. We are interested
66For instance, Gertler and Karadi (2011) consider a similar shock in their version of the financial
accelerator model with explicit banking.
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i exam ning the effects that updating of beliefs has on asset prices, and the wider
economy.
Over ll, the wedge shock generat st ong (boom-bust) cycle in both the asset
prices a d th general economy. The shock causes optimism on the stock m rket
since capital is expected to generate a much higher return than the fundamental one,
causing market value of capital to rise already today. The market value increases by
0.2 %, which is 0.6 % above the book value. There are two effects from this. The
immediate effect is that capital is more attractive, and so induces more investment
by entrepreneurs. In addition, because the value of net worth increases this eases
the borrowing constraints that entrepreneurs face. As a result, they can take out
more loans, and use the credit to invest further into capital, The total effect is that
net worth and investment increase by 0.4% and 0.8 %. In line with the empirics,
there is also a wealth effect on consumption from a higher stock market value. The
wealth effect on households is marginal since consumption increases by only 0.011 %
but the larger effect comes from entrepreneurial consumption, which rises by 0.8%.
The final effect from the demand-side expansion is that output expands by 0.16 %.67
Nonetheless, as soon as expectations about the future return of assets deteriorate
(after the first quarter), a negative spiral starts to hit in. The market return on
capital falls by 0.28 %, which causes the market value of assets to fall as well as
investment, since it is now less attractive to invest because of a lower expected capital
returns. Additionally, falling asset prices mean that the value of internal funds starts
to deteriorate, which results in higher restrictions to external financing (collateral
constraint binds sooner). This will cause a further fall in investment, which will
result in lower net worth in the subsequent period, and so on. Hence, 4 quarters
after the initial shock, market value of capital drops to below the steady state level,
which causes investment to fall below its’ steady state level in the subsequent quarter.
The total effect on production is immediate, and output starts to contract (albeit
weakly) 4 quarters after the initial shock. Despite the relatively slower fall of market
value of capita compared to the book value, the negative economic prospects cause
a steady drop in the market value, resulting in output being below its steady state
level for almost 15 quarters. Only 5 years (20 quarters) after the initial shock does
the economy recover from the contraction, and output turns back to its steady state
67Remember that the AR parameter for this shock is set to 0.67. Note therefore how the
impulse responses for this shock are smaller than for any other supply-side or financial/monetary
shock. This is another proof of how financial shocks transmitted via the supply side have larger
macroeconomic effects than when transmitted via the demand side.
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level. We therefore observe the full cycle in our impulse responses. Our output (and
investment) cycle is in line with the empirical literature which finds that output, on
ave age takes longer time to recover after stock market boom than after any other
type of expansion. Moreover, as a result of a stock market boom, the recessionary
period is lo g r than the expan ionary.68
II.3 Impulse response analysis in the behavioural model -
remaining shocks
II.3.1 Monetary policy shock
The responses to a monetary policy shock are reported in Figure II.10. As is stan-
dard, an expansionary monetary policy (0.5% fall) leads to a fall in the external
finance premium, which relaxes the credit that firms can access and therefore pushes
up investment (0.3%). This pushes up capital accumulation (0.4%). This expansion
is perceived by agents as a period of positive outlook, which triggers the optimism
(animal spirits up 0.2%). This optimism is translated into an increase in deposits
(0.25%) and bank equity (0.3%). The expansion leads to an increase in output
(0.20%) and a rise in inflation (0.01%), but with a lag of 1 quarter.69
However, this optimism is very brief as the monetary authority raises the interest
rate (0.1%) to combat the rising inflation. By the agents, this is perceived as the
end of the expansionary phase, resulting in a reversal of the sentiment to pessimism
(animal spirits fall by 0.05%). The consequence is a turn in the response of macroe-
conomic and financial aggregates, leading to return of these variables to the steady
state.
Hence in the behavioural model, we see two waves of responses. The first, stan-
dard in the DSGE models, driven directly by a monetary policy expansion. The
second, on the other hand, is purely driven by animal spirits. The response of the
monetary authority to the initial expansion kills and turns the initial optimism into
a pessmism (or negative bubble on the financial market). This results in a reversal
in the financial and macroeconomic aggregates, making the initial monetary expan-
sion extremly short-lived. This type of market behaviour are difficult to capture in
standard DSGE models (but frequently observed empirically).
68The responses in Gerba (2014) extension are the same as int he full model since the stock
market dynamics is modelled in the same way.
69Initially, output falls by 0.25% as well as inflation by 0.05%, but this is reverted after 1 period.
This finding is frequent in the literature and denominated as the price puzzle.
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up investment (0.3%). This pushes up capital accumulation (0.4%). This expansion
is perceived by agents as a period of positive outlook, which triggers the optimism
(animal spirits up 0.2%). This optimism is translated into an increase in deposits
(0.25%) and bank equity (0.3%). The expansion leads to an increase in output
(0.20%) and a rise in inflation (0.01%), but with a lag of 1 quarter.69
However, this optimism is very brief as the monetary authority raises the interest
rate (0.1%) to combat the rising inflation. By the agents, this is perceived as the
end of the expansionary phase, resulting in a reversal of the sentiment to pessimism
(animal spirits fall by 0.05%). The consequence is a turn in the response of macroe-
conomic and financial aggregates, leading to return of these variables to the steady
state.
Hence in the behavioural model, we see two waves of responses. The first, stan-
dard in the DSGE models, driven directly by a monetary policy expansion. The
second, on the other hand, is purely driven by animal spirits. The response of the
monetary authority to the initial expansion kills and turns the initial optimism into
a pessmism (or negative bubble on the financial market). This results in a reversal
in the financial and macroeconomic aggrega es, making the initial monetary expan-
sion extremly short-lived. This type of market behaviour are difficult to capture in
standard DSGE models (but frequently observed empirically).
68The responses in Gerba (2014) extension are the same as int he full model since the stock
market dynamics is modelled in the same way.
69Initially, output falls by 0.25% as well as inflation by 0.05%, but this is reverted after 1 period.
This finding is frequent in the literature and denominated as the price puzzle.
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II.3.2 Shock to utilization costs
The responses to a shock in utilization costs are reported in Figure II.12. The
second of the supply side shocks is a 0.5% decrease in the cost of utilizing capital
in production (i.e. a positive supply-side shock). This will therefore increase the
marginal benefit or return to capital, which will increase the demand for capital.
Hence, capital good producers will produce more, and so investment rises (0.02%).
The level of capital will also rise significantly (0.2%) as a result of both capital
demand and supply expansion. Therefore, output will expand (0.1%). Because of
the higher capital (and thus collateral) and the resulting fall in the financing spread,
the quantity of credit to firms will expand (0.7%). Since this is an improvement on
the supply side, inflation initially falls (0.03%), and the monetary authority reacts
by reducing the interest rate (0.15%). This is reverted as soon as the monetary
authority increases the interest rate (0.02%) because of the recovery in the inflation.
Following 15 years after the shock, in the new steady state, firm credit and deposits
are 0.6% and 0.2% above the pre-shock level. Again a temporary supply-side shock
is having permanent effects on financial sector activity.
II.4 Figures in the DSGE model
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Figure II.1: Responses to a productivity shock
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II.3.2 Shock to utilization costs
The responses to a shock in utilization costs are reported in Figure II.12. The
second of the supply side shocks is a 0.5% decrease in the cost of utilizing capital
in production (i.e. a positive supply-side shock). This will therefore increase the
marginal benefit or return to capital, which will increase the demand for capital.
Hence, capital good producers will produce more, and so investment rises (0.02%).
The level of capital will also rise significantly (0.2%) as a result of both capital
demand and supply expansion. Therefore, output will expand (0.1%). Because of
the higher capital (and thus collateral) and the resulting fall in the financing spread,
the quantity of credit to firms will expand (0.7%). Since this is an improvement on
the supply side, inflation initially falls (0.03%), and the monetary authority reacts
by reducing the interest rate (0.15%). This is reverted as soon as the monetary
authority increases the interest rate (0.02%) because of the recovery in the inflation.
Following 15 years after the shock, in the new steady state, firm credit and deposits
are 0.6% and 0.2% above the pre-shock level. Again a temporary supply-side shock
is having permanent effects on financial sector activity.
II.4 Figures in the DSGE model
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Notes: Impulse responses to an expansionary TFP shock in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is ϑ, utilization costs u, Market
asset price s, book value q and residual earnings re.
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Figure II.2: Responses to a productivity shock in BGG(1999)
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Notes: Impulse responses to an expansionary TFP shock in the BGG (1999) model.
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Notes: Impulse respon es to an expansionary TFP shock in the BGG (1999) model.
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Figure II.3: Responses to a monetary policy shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is ϑ, utilization
costs u, market asset price s, book value q and residual earnings re.
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Notes: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is ϑ, utilization
costs u, market asset price s, book value q and residual earnings re.
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Figure II.4: Responses to a monetary policy shock in BGG(1999)
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Notes: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the BGG (1999) model.
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Notes: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the BGG (1999) model.
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Figure II.5: Responses to a shock in utilization costs
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Notes: Impulse responses to a positive shock to utilization costs in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is ϑ, utilization costs u,
market asset price s, book value q and residual earnings re.
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Figure II.6: Responses to an asset price wedge shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to an expansionary (asset price) wedge shock in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is ϑ, utilization
costs u, market asset price s, book value q and residual earnings re.
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Notes: Impulse responses to an expansionary (asset price) wedge shock in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is ϑ, utilization
costs u, market asset price s, book value q and residual earnings re.
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Figure II.7: Responses to an asset price wedge shock in Gerba (2014)
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Notes: Impulse responses to an expansionary (asset price) wedge shock in the Gerba (2014) model.
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Not s: Impulse responses to an xpansi nary (asset price) wedge shock in the Gerba (2014) model.
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Figure II.8: Responses to a relaxation in the firm financing costs (external finance premium)
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Notes: Impulse responses to a relaxation (negative shock) of the firm financing costs in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is
ϑ, utilization costs u, market asset price s, book value q and residual earnings re.
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Notes: Impulse responses to relaxation (negative shock) of the firm financing costs in the DSGE model. The responses of cash-in-advance constraint is
ϑ, utilization cos s u, market asset price s, book v ue q a d residual earnings re.
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Figure II.9: Responses to a relaxation in the firm financing costs (external finance premium) in BGG(1999)
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Notes: Impulse responses to a relaxation (negative shock) of the firm financing costs in the BGG (1999) model.
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II.5 Figures in the behavioural model
–’
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Figure II.10: Impulse responses to a expansionary monetary policy shock in t=100
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Figure II.11: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock in t=100
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Figure II.12: Impulse responses to a shock in utilization cost in t=100
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Figure II.13: Impulse responses to a shock in firm financing cost in t=100
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Figure II.14: Full impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock with
95% confidence interval
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Figure II.15: Full impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock with 95%
confidence interval
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Figure II.15: Full impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock with 95%
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Figure II.16: Full impulse responses to shock in utilization cost with 95% confidence
interval
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Figure II.17: Full impulse responses to a relaxation in firm financing conditions with
95% confidence interval
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Figure II.18: Evolution of the key aggregate variables
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Figure II.19: Evolution of the key aggregate variables 2
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Figure II.20: Evolution of the key aggregate variables 3
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Figure II.21: Evolution of the key aggregate variables 4
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Figure II.22: Histograms
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Figure II.23: Histograms 2
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Figure II.24: Histograms 3
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Figure II.25: Agent behaviour and animal spirits
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Figure II.26: Agent behaviour and animal spirits 2
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